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Abstract:	   In	   a	   recent	   work,	   ‘Thinking	   Outside	   the	   Toolbox’,	   we	   mounted	   a	  qualified	  defence	  of	  analytic	  metaphysics	   in	   the	   face	  of	  ardent	  criticism.	   	  While	  sympathizing	   with	   other	   philosophers	   of	   science	   in	   decrying	   the	   lack	   of	  engagement	   of	   metaphysicians	   with	   real	   science	   when	   addressing	   central	  metaphysical	   problems,	   we	   also	  wanted	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   role	   that	   analytic	  metaphysics	  has	  played	  in	  providing	  useful	  tools	  for	  naturalistic	  metaphysicians.	  	  This	  double-­‐edged	  stance	  compels	  us	  to	  identify	  what	  feature	  it	  is	  that	  marks	  out	  as	  problematic	  some,	  but	  not	  all,	  analytic	  metaphysics,	  and	  this	  we	  thought	  we	  could	  do	  by	  appeal	  to	  something	  we	  call	  here	  the	  compatibility	  principle.	  It	  now	  strikes	   us,	   however,	   that	   the	   approach	   we	   took	   in	   that	   earlier	   work	   is	  fundamentally	  unstable.	   	  After	   giving	   a	   streamlined	  presentation	  of	   our	   earlier	  argument,	  we	  will	   identify	  where	  we	   take	   the	   instability	   to	   lie.	   From	   there	  we	  shall	  make	  a	  more	  nuanced	  proposal	  for	  how	  naturalistic	  metaphysicians	  should	  regard	  the	  work	  of	  their	  analytic	  counterparts.	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  A	  couple	  of	  years	  ago,	  we	  were	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  reflections	   of	   Michael	   Dummett	   on	   the	   state	   of	   contemporary	   analytic	  philosophy.1	   We	   were	   asked,	   in	   particular,	   to	   comment	   upon	   his	   lament	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Michael	   Dummett	   was	   in	   turn	   invited	   to	   comment	   on	   our	   reflections	   in	   the	  same	   volume,	   but	   very	   sadly	   shortly	   after	   we	   finished	   writing	   our	   article	   he	  passed	  away.	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regarding	  the	  present	   lack	  of	  engagement	  between	  philosophy	  and	  physics.	   	  As	  he	  put	  it,	  	  What	   is	   a	   genuine	   case	   of	   regret	   is	   the	   paucity	   of	   dialogue	   between	  philosophers	   and	   physicists.	   The	   generality	   of	   philosophers	   know	   too	  little	  physics	  to	  dare	  to	  venture	  to	  treat	  of	   the	  philosophical	  problems	  it	  raises,	   or	   to	   take	   due	   account	   of	   physical	   theories	   when	   addressing	  problems	  on	  which	   they	  bear...	  Never	  before,	   I	   believe,	   have	  philosophy	  and	  the	  natural	  sciences	  been	  so	  far	  apart.2	  We	   should	   emphasize	   that	   Dummett	   is	   similarly	   disparaging	   of	   ‘scientistic’	  attitudes	  on	   the	  part	  of	  many	  scientists	   themselves	  –	  as	  he	  says,	   ‘it	   is	  not	   from	  science	   that	   we	   know	   genocide	   is	   wicked,	   or	   that	   Michaelangelo	   was	   a	   great	  artist’	  –	  and	  also	  of	   the	  resultant	   ‘shameful	   intimidation’	  of	  some	  philosophers,	  ‘who	  hope	  that	  by	  humbling	  themselves	  before	  the	  sciences	  they	  will	  be	  entitled	  to	   share	   in	   some	   of	   their	   triumphalism.’	   	   But	   his	   frustration	   concerning	   the	  remove	   of	   analytic	   philosophy,	   and	   of	   analytic	  metaphysics	   in	   particular,	   from	  contemporary	   science	   is	   shared	   by	   many	   philosophers	   of	   physics,	   and	   we	  wanted	  to	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  how	  we	  ourselves	  stood	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  criticisms	  presented	  by	  our	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  colleagues.3	  	  Our	   claim	   in	   that	  paper	  was	   that	  philosophers	  of	  physics	   –	   at	   least	   those	  who,	  like	  us,	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  physics	  –	  are	  not	   in	  any	  position	  to	  decry	   scientifically	   disengaged	   metaphysics	   tout	   court,	   because	   analytic	  metaphysics	   has	   proved	   a	   useful	   heuristic	   for	   philosophers	   of	   physics.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  also	  felt	  convinced	  that	  many	  of	  the	  examples	  philosophers	  of	  physics	   have	   cited	   in	   support	   of	   their	   anti-­‐metaphysical	   stance	   raised	   genuine	  problems	   for	  metaphysics.	   	  What	  we	  therefore	  attempted	  to	  do	  was	  demarcate	  between	   the	   scientifically	   disengaged	   metaphysics	   that	   was	   prima	   facie	  somehow	  legitimate,	  and	  the	  scientifically	  disengaged	  metaphysics	  that	  we	  think	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Dummett	  2012,	  p.	  19.	  3	  Note	  that	  since	  our	  claim	  will	  be	  that	  the	  most	  extreme	  claims	  of	  both	  sides	  in	  this	   debate	   have	   to	   be	   tempered,	   what	   we	   have	   to	   say	   will	   also	   have	   critical	  ramifications	  for	  the	  avowed	  ‘scientism’	  of	  some	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  such	  as	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  (2007).	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ought	   to	   be	   condemned.	   	   Since	   then,	   however,	   we	   have	   come	   to	   regard	   the	  distinction	  as	  we	  drew	  it	  there	  as	  fundamentally	  unstable,	  and	  part	  of	  what	  we	  would	  like	  to	  do	  in	  what	  follows	  is	  to	  explain	  why.	  In	  the	  ensuing,	  we’ll	  therefore	  present	  a	  streamlined	  outline	  of	  the	  argument	  of	  our	   earlier	   paper,	   before	   going	   on	   to	   highlight	   the	   instability	   that	   we	   now	  perceive	   in	   it.	   	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   we	   have	   come	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   ‘heuristic’	  justification	  we	  offered	  for	  (what	  we	  took	  to	  be)	  a	  subset	  of	  analytic	  metaphysics	  cannot	  but	  sanction	  all	  metaphysics	  whatsoever.	  	  However,	  while	  it	  might	  sound	  as	  though	  this	  casts	  analytic	  metaphysicians	  as	  (to	  speak	  crudely)	  the	  ‘winners’	  of	   this	   debate	   –	   something	   that	   Dummett	   himself	   would	   no	   doubt	   have	   been	  unhappy	  with	  –	  we	  ourselves	  think	  it	  does	  no	  such	  thing.	  	  We	  think,	  rather,	  that	  this	  conclusion	  serves	  to	  highlight	  just	  how	  conditionalized	  the	  value	  of	  analytic	  metaphysics	  is	  from	  a	  naturalistic	  point	  of	  view.	  That	  conditionalized	  support	  for	  metaphysics,	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  philosophers	  of	  physics,	  may	  be	  compared	  with	   the	   criticisms	   we	   will	   by	   that	   point	   have	   mounted	   against	   metaphysics,	  
conceived	   of	   as	   many	   analytic	   metaphysicians	   themselves	   do.	   	   	   Although	   the	  picture	   that	   results	   is	   a	   complex	   one,	   we	   think	   the	   comparison	   reveals	   that,	  whatever	  the	  positive	  spin	  that	  can	  be	  put	  on	  it,	  the	  naturalistic	  backlash	  against	  analytic	   metaphysics	   remains	   well-­‐motivated	   and	   that	   metaphysics	   needs	   to	  recommit	  to	  science	  if	  it	  is	  to	  succeed	  in	  its	  own	  terms.	  Before	  we	   proceed	  with	   all	   that,	   however,	   some	   terminological	   and	   dialectical	  remarks	  are	  in	  order.	  	  By	  ‘analytic’	  metaphysics,	  we	  will	  mean	  metaphysics	  that	  is	  ‘non-­‐naturalistic’;	  by	  ‘naturalistic’	  metaphysics,	  we	  will	  mean	  metaphysics	  that	  somehow	  ‘engages	  with’,	   ‘is	  continuous	  with’,	  or	   is	   in	  some	  sense	   ‘informed	  by’	  science4.	   	  While	  we	   appreciate	   that	   these	   are	  metaphors	   and	   that	   spelling	   out	  what	   they,	   and	   thus	   ‘naturalistic	  metaphysics’	   itself,	   actually	  amount	   to	   is	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  So,	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  former	  we	  include	  discussions	  of	  ‘gunk’	  in	  mereology,	  and	  of	  the	  latter,	  we	  would	  include	  consideration	  of	  whether	  quantum	  mechanics	  supports	   monism;	   we	   will	   provide	   further	   examples	   below.	   	   Note	   that	   this	  distinction	   is	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  relevant	  considerations	  or	  discussion;	  one	  and	  the	  same	  metaphysician	  can	  work	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  divide.	  	  Note	   finally	   that	   if	   the	   reader	   is	   sceptical	   that	   there	   is	   a	   firm	  distinction	   to	   be	  drawn	  here,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  problematize	  precisely	  that	  assumption!	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trivial	  (cf.	  Chakravartty	  (2013)),	  for	  present	  purposes	  we	  will	  take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  good	  enough	  agreement	  at	  least	  on	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  term.5	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  idea	  that	  naturalistic	  metaphysics	  is	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  enquiry	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  relative	  ‘closeness’	  to	  the	  sciences	  is	  not	  one	  that	  will	  be	  questioned	  in	  this	  work.	  	  The	   principal	   motivation	   for	   the	   current	   paper	   is	   to	   investigate	   the	   claims	  naturalistic	   metaphysicians	   have	   made	   regarding	   the	   diminished	   status	   of	  analytic	   metaphysics	   relative	   to	   that	   of	   their	   own;	   whether	   or	   not	   that	   latter	  status	  is	  itself	  legitimate	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  another	  day.	  	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  Critical	  Background	  As	  noted	  above,	  many	  contemporary	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  share	  the	  concerns	  that	   Dummett	   voiced	   regarding	   the	   insular	   nature	   of	   today’s	   analytic	  metaphysics.	  	  These	  frustrations	  have	  been	  expounded	  in	  articles	  and	  works	  by	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  	  –	  see,	  for	  example,	  Maudlin	  (2007),	  Callender	  (2011),	  and	  Price	  (2009)	  	  –	  but	  the	  classic	  statement	  of	  the	  view	  is	  without	  doubt	  Chapter	  1	  of	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross’	  Every	  Thing	  Must	  Go.	  	  As	  they	  put	  it,	  “one	  of	  the	  main	   contentions	   [of	   that	   work]	   is	   that	   contemporary	   analytic	   metaphysics,	   a	  professional	   activity	   engaged	   in	   by	   some	   extremely	   intelligent	   and	   morally	  serious	   people,	   fails	   to	   qualify	   as	   part	   of	   the	   enlightened	   pursuit	   of	   objective	  truth,	  and	  should	  be	  discontinued’’.6	   	  Reading	  through	  their	  opening	  chapter	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  works	  cited	  above,	  one	  finds	  several	  grounds	  cited	  for	  making	  such	  scathing	  claims	  regarding	  the	  work	  of	  their	  colleagues	  across	  the	  hall.	  
i.	   Metaphysics	   is	   frivolous.	   	   Leaf	   through	   a	   handful	   of	   recent	   works	   in	  metaphysics	   and	   you	   will	   soon	   find	   yourself	   on	   trips	   to	   possible	   worlds	  populated	   by	   zombies7,	   disembodied	   spirits8,	   unicorns9,	   dragons10,	   trout-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  fact	  that	  metaphysicians	  tend	  to	  self-­‐identify	  as	  one	  or	  the	  other	  of	  course	  lends	  support	  to	  this	  claim.	  6	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross,	  p.	  vii.	  7	  Eg.	  Chalmers	  1996	  8	  E.g.	  Yoshimi	  2007.	  9	  Lewis	  1986,	  88.	  10	  Ibid.	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turkeys11,	  writer-­‐cucumbers12,	  gunk	  spheres13,	  and	  –	  in	  a	  chummy	  in-­‐joke	  –	  the	  mereological	   fusion	   of	   David	   Lewis	   and	   a	   talking	   donkey14.	   	   Even	   the	   most	  unrepentant	   of	   analytic	  metaphysicians	   should	   be	  willing	   to	   concede	   that	   it	   at	  least	   looks	   bad	   that	   such	   paraphernalia	   is	   the	   stock-­‐in-­‐trade	   of	   today’s	  metaphysicians,	   given	   their	   pretensions	   to	   be	   engaged	   in	   a	   noble	   intellectual	  pursuit.	   	  An	  obvious	  reply	  at	   this	  point	  would	  of	  course	  be	   that,	   if	  one	  were	   to	  rummage	  through	  the	  literature	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  then	  one	  could	  also	  pull	  out	  examples	  of	  such	  fantastical	  creatures	  as	  evil	  demons	  slamming	  doors	  open	  and	  shut	  and	  people	  with	  electron	  microscope	  eyes.15	   	  Nevertheless,	  one	  could	  plausibly	   claim	   that	   the	   use	   of	   such	   exotica	   in	   the	   latter	   case	   is	   merely	   to	  illustrate	   a	   thesis	   that	   could	   very	   well	   be	   stated	   without	   it;	   in	   the	   former,	  however,	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  gunk-­‐sphere	  or	  a	  zombie	  is	  somehow	  very	  much	  a	  `real’	  possibility	  does	  essential	  work	   in	   the	  arguments	   in	  which	   they	  are	   cited,	   since	  their	  very	  possibility	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  refute	  a	  rival	  thesis.	  	  As	  such,	  taking	  these	  preposterous	   entities	   ontologically	   seriously	   is	   crucial	   in	   the	   analytic	   context,	  and	  the	  seriousness	  that	  we	  feel	  able	  to	  impart	  to	  metaphysics	  correspondingly	  diminished.16	  
ii.	  Metaphysics	  relies	   too	  much	  on	   intuition	   trading.	  Rather	   than	  coherence	  with	   any	   body	   of	   theory	   outside	   itself,	   metaphysics	   often	   depends	   heavily	   on	  appeals	   to	   intuition	   in	  order	   to	   justify	   its	   claims.	   	  Nowhere	   to	  our	  mind	   is	   this	  better	  exemplified	  than	  in	  the	  debate	  around	  van	  Inwagen’s	  ‘special	  composition	  question’.	   	   	  When	   thinking	   about	   the	   general	   conditions	  under	  which	   a	   pair	   of	  objects	   could	   be	   said	   to	   form	   a	  whole,	   van	   Inwagen	   considers	   such	   options	   as	  stitching,	   gluing,	   and	   making	   contiguous,	   and	   asserts	   in	   each	   case	   that	   our	  intuition	  tells	  against	  regarding	  the	  resultant	  putative	  composite	  as	  a	  legitimate	  object.17	  	  These	  consultations	  of	  his	  intuitions	  moreover	  do	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Lewis	  1991,	  7.	  12	  Elder	  2013,	  75	  	  13	  Sider	  1993.	  	  	  14	  Hawthorne	  and	  Uzquiano	  2011	  15	  Maxwell	  1962.	  16	   Indeed,	   ‘zombie’	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   cited	   terms	   in	   Chalmers’	   book,	   since	   his	  	  anti-­‐reductionist	  thesis	  depends	  strongly	  on	  their	  possibility.	  17	  Van	  Inwagen	  	  (1990)	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work	   in	   his	   argument	   for	   the	   notorious	   claim	   that	   there	   are	   no	   composites	  except	   composite	   living	   things.	   	   It	   should	   be	   underlined	   that	   few	   people	   in	  metaphysics	  buy	  into	  van	  Inwagen’s	  theory:	  Ted	  Sider,	  for	  example,	  takes	  it	  to	  be	  refuted	  by	  his	  intuition	  that	  ‘surely	  there	  is	  a	  gunk	  world	  in	  which	  some	  gunk	  is	  shaped	   into	   a	   giant	   sphere,	   and	   another	  where	   some	   gunk	   has	   the	   shape	   of	   a	  cube.	  Surely,	  there	  are	  gunk	  worlds	  that	  most	  of	  us	  would	  describe	  as	  containing	  objects	   much	   like	   objects	   from	   our	   world:	   tables	   and	   chairs,	   mountains	   and	  molehills,	   etc.’18	   In	   other	   words,	   Sider’s	   intuitions	   are	   invoked	   to	   counter	   van	  Inwagen’s	   intuitions,	   but	  whether	   the	   former	   count	   as	   any	  weightier	   than	   the	  latter	  is	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  decide.	  Again,	  we	   can	   concede	   that	   every	   theory,	  whether	   in	   philosophy	   or	   science,	   is	  going	   to	   have	   to	   have	   rely	   on	   intuitions	   at	   some	   point.	   Accoridng	   to	   many	  accounts,	  scientists,	  for	  example,	  have	  hunches	  about	  what	  hypotheses	  to	  test,	  or	  which	   approximation	   methods	   might	   work	   –	   hunches	   that	   often	   prove	   very	  fruitful	   even	   if	   they	  ultimately	   cannot	   say	  why19.	   	   Similarly,	  many	  programs	   in	  naturalistic	   metaphysics	   often	   begin	   with	   intuitions	   that	   more	   received	  metaphysical	  pictures	  are	  not	  adequate	  to	  modern-­‐day	  science	  (this	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  with	  the	  structuralist	  metaphysics	  to	  be	  discussed	  below).	  	  But	  it	  seems	  that	  these	  is	  an	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  role	  of	  intuition	  in	  each	  case:	  in	  the	  scientific	  case,	  and	  arguably	  in	  the	  naturalistic	  case,	  the	  intuitions	  are	  functioning	  only	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  a	  guide	  to	  what	  to	  try	  and	  justify	  by	  other	  means20;	  by	  contrast,	  in	  the	   van	   Inwagen	   case	   intuition	   itself	   has	   an	   essential	   justificatory	   role.	   	   Given	  that	  we	   no	   longer	   have	  God	   in	   the	   picture	   to	   underwrite	   the	   veracity	   of	   these	  intuitions,	  and	  given	  moreover	  the	  litany	  of	  errors	  that	  intuition	  has	  led	  us	  to,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  reliance	  upon	  them	  for	  justification	  is	  a	  deeply	  problematic	  aspect	  of	  present-­‐day	  metaphysics.21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   Sider	   1993,	   p286.	   	   ‘Gunk’	   is	   a	   term	   for	   matter	   that	   is	   resolvable	   into	  mereological	  parts	  ad	  infinitum.	  19	   Although	   the	   role	   and	   overall	   significance	   of	   such	   hunches	   may	   be	  considerably	   less	   than	   such	   accounts	   presume,	   particularly	   given	   the	   role	   of	  heuristic	   factors	   discussed	   in	   numerous	   analyses	   of	   scientific	   discovery	   and	  pursuit.	  	  20	  Here	  one	  might	  invoke	  some	  form	  of	  the	  discovery-­‐justification	  distinction.	  	  21	  Cf.	  Putnam	  1962.	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iii.	  Metaphysics	  has	  become	  altogether	  too	  domesticated.	   	  A	  curious	  feature	  of	  analytic	  metaphysics	  is	  that,	  over	  a	  period	  roughly	  contemporaneous	  with	  that	  in	   which	   it	   became	   decoupled	   from	   physics,	   it	   became	   preoccupied	   with	   the	  
ontologically	  fundamental.22	  It	  was	  not	  that	  long	  ago	  that	  analytic	  philosophy	  was	  dominated	  by	  ‘ordinary	  language’	  considerations,	  and	  ordinary	  objects	  in	  turn.23	  	  But	  for	  reasons	  that	  we	  won’t	  attempt	  to	  chart	  here,	  the	  concern	  with	  ordinary	  objects	  was	   largely	   replaced	  with	   an	   express	   concern	  with	   the	   fundamental	   in	  particular.24	   	  Thus	   in	   the	   contemporary	   literature	  one	   finds	  assertions	   that	   the	  fundamental	   level	  can	  be	  resolved	  without	  remainder	   into	  a	  separable	   ‘mosaic’	  of	   local	   matters	   of	   fact25;	   side-­‐taking	   over	   Markosian’s	   debate	   concerning	  whether	   the	   ‘fundamental	   building	   blocks’	   of	   matter	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	  ‘pointy’	   or	   rather	   ‘maximally	   continuous	   extended’	   simples,	   akin	   to	   tiny	  bits	   of	  plasticine26;	   and	   debates	   over	   the	   modal	   implications	   of	   fundamental	   physics	  properties,	  such	  as	  quark	  color	  and	  flavor,	  played	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  quarks	  can	  be	  permuted	  among	  one	  another	  in	  space27.	  	  But	  the	  claim	  regarding	  the	   ‘mosaic’	   is	   simply	  asserted	  as	   if	  quantum	  mechanics	  never	  happened28;	   the	  debate	   over	   the	   structure	   of	   fundamental	   entities	   is	   conducted	   as	   though	   that	  between	  Democritus	  and	  Anaxagoras	  remains	  fit	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  model;	  and	  the	  debate	   over	   the	   modal	   profile	   of	   the	   fundamental	   physics	   properties	   is	  conducted	  as	  though	  these	  properties	  and	  the	  laws	  they	  feature	  in	  are	  the	  same	  in	  all	  relevant	  metaphysical	  respects	  as	  their	  classical	  counterparts.29	  In	  sum,	  in	  each	  case	   it	   is	  simply	  assumed	   that	   the	  most	   fundamental	  regimes	  of	   the	  world	  can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   ‘doll’s	   house’	   version	   of	   the	   world	   of	   everyday	  experience.	  	  But	  while	  few	  pretend	  to	  have	  a	  satisfactory	  positive	  picture	  of	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  e.g.	  Paul	  2012	  for	  an	  explicit	  statement	  of	  this	  view.	  23	   The	   ‘descriptive’	   metaphysics	   associated	   with	   Strawson’s	   Individuals	   is	   an	  example	  of	  what	  we	  have	  in	  mind.	  	  	  24	  Callender	  2011	  gives	  some	  important	  parts	  of	  the	  story.	  25	  Lewis	  1986;	  Kim	  1998.	  	  26	  See	  e.g.	  Markosian	  (1998)	  27	  Lewis	  (1986),	  163.	  28	   Recall	   our	   point	   about	   the	   division	   between	   ‘analytic’	   and	   ‘naturalistic’	  metaphysics:	   Lewis	   of	   course	   did	   acknowledge	   that	   quantum	  mechanics	  might	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  ‘mosaic’	  account	  but	  the	  point	  remains	  that	  neither	  he	  nor	  many	  other	  metaphysicians	  explored	  the	  nature	  or	  extent	  of	  that	  impact.	  	  29	  For	  commentary	  on	  this	  last	  debate,	  see	  McKenzie	  forthcoming.	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fundamental	  reality	  is	  like,	  we	  do	  know	  that	  it	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  maintain	  that	  it	  is	  like	  the	  way	  that	  these	  classical	  pictures	  dressed	  up	  in	  modern	  physics	  clothing	  present	   it.30	   Even	   a	   passing	   acquaintance	   with	   the	   science	   pages	   of	   the	  newspaper	  would	  suffice	  to	  establish	  that.	  Since	   it	   is	   this	   last	   set	   of	   criticisms	   that	   directly	   concern	   the	   relationship	   of	  metaphysics	   and	  physics,	   it	   is	   this	   set	   that	  we,	   as	   philosophers	   of	   physics,	   feel	  most	  confident	  in	  asserting.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  therefore,	  we	  will	  take	  the	  fact	  that	  analytic	   metaphysics	   is	   overwhelmingly	   wedded	   to	   an	   outdated	   ontological	  picture	   to	   constitute	   the	   core	   criticism	   of	   it.	   	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   this	   feature	   which	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  themselves	  are	  most	  frustrated	  by.	  As	  they	  put,	  “mainstream	  contemporary	  analytic	  metaphysics”	  is	  ‘no	  longer	  ‘informed	  by	  real	  physics’’	  and	  “has,	   like	   the	   nineteenth-­‐century	   metaphysics	   against	   which	   Russell	   revolted,	  become	   almost	   entirely	   a	   priori’’.	   	   It	   is	   principally	   on	   these	   grounds	   that	   they	  hold	  it	  should	  be	  ‘’discontinued''.	  This	   is	   fighting	   talk!	   	   But	   we	   should	   be	   absolutely	   clear	   at	   the	   outset	   that	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  such	  as	  ourselves,	  Maudlin,	  and	  Ladyman	  and	  co.	  are	  all	  likewise	   inclined	   to	  metaphysical	   speculation,	   albeit,	  we	   claim,	   of	   an	   avowedly	  ‘naturalistic’	  sort.	  	  	  It	  therefore	  seems	  only	  fair	  to	  ask	  whether	  such	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  are	  really	  in	  any	  position	  to	  baldly	  assert	  that	  other	  approaches	  within	  the	  discipline	  ought	  to	  simply	  be	  drawn	  to	  a	  halt.	  	  To	  cut	  to	  the	  chase,	  our	  feeling	  is	  such	  a	  sweeping	  claim	  is	  ultimately	  unjustified.	  	  And	  we	  think	  that	  we	  can	  cite	  some	  facts	  about	  how	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  is	  done	  in	  support	  of	  that	  view.	  	  
3.	  The	  Heuristic	  Approach	  to	  Metaphysics	  Our	   claim	   is	   that	  once	  we	   reflect	   on	  how	  philosophy	  of	  physics	   is	  produced	   in	  practice,	   we	   see	   that	   imposing	   a	   blanket	   ban	   on	   scientifically	   disinterested	  metaphysics	   would	   likely	   be	   counterproductive.	   	   As	   such,	   naturalistically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Of	   course,	  different	   interpretations	  of	  quantum	  mechanics	  make	   reality	   look	  more	  and	  less	  classical.	   	  But	  quantum	  mechanics	  is	  not	  classical	  mechanics,	  and	  thus	  all	  of	  them	  will	  be	  non-­‐classical	  in	  some	  respect.	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inclined	  metaphysicians	  would	  be	  ill-­‐advised	  to	  criticize	  metaphysics	  merely	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  disengagement	  from	  science.31	  	  	  To	   flesh	   out	   this	   claim,	  we	   find	   it	   useful	   to	   explain	   how	   it	   is	   that	  we	   go	   about	  creating	  structuralist	  metaphysics	  of	  physics	  in	  particular.	  	  What	  makes	  this	  case	  so	  apposite	  –	  aside	   from	  the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   the	  area	   in	  which	  we	  both	  work	  –	   is	  that	   structuralism	   is	   the	   metaphysical	   programme	   defended	   by	   Ladyman	   and	  Ross,	   the	  chief	  horsemen	  of	   the	  metaphysical	  apocalypse;	  and	  yet	   is	  a	  research	  program	  that	  is	  up	  to	  its	  eyeballs	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  involved	  metaphysics.	  	  	  As	  such,	  it	  seems	   an	   appropriate	   ground	   for	   testing	   whether	   naturalistic	   metaphysicians	  such	   Ladyman	   are	   trying	   to	   have	   things	   both	  ways.	   	   So	   to	   begin,	   let	   us	   briefly	  introduce	  what	  we	  understand	  by	  the	  doctrine	  known	  as	  ‘ontic	  structuralism’.	  In	   a	   nutshell,	   ontic	   structuralism	   is	   the	   view	   that	   relational	   structure	   is	  ontologically	   fundamental.	   	   The	   doctrine	   proposes	   that	   if	   we	   take	   modern	  physics	   –	   principally,	   quantum	   theory	   and	   relativity	   –	   seriously,	   then	   the	  category	   of	   physical	   objects	   must	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   derivative	   category,	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  category	  of	  structure;	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  that	  it	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  category	  ontologically	  prior	   to	   that	  of	  relations	  and	  structure.	   	   It	  contends	   that	   the	   centrality	   of	   symmetry	   considerations	   in	   contemporary	  physics	   is	  a	  harbinger	  of	  deep	  ontological	   facts,	   that	   the	   identity	  conditions	   for	  both	  individuals	  and	  kinds	  are	  parasitic	  on	  structures	  in	  some	  essential	  way,	  and	  that	  global	  nomic	  concepts	  must	  replace	  more	  local,	  dispositional	  ones.	  	  As	  even	  that	  cursory	  survey	  makes	  clear,	  ontic	  structuralism	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	   cluster	  of	   claims,	   any	  one	  of	  which	   is	   sorely	   in	  need	  of	   careful	  and	  sustained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  To	  be	  clear,	  our	  claim	  is	  based	  on	  how	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  is,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  ‘done’,	  and	  thus	  on	  facts	  about	  how	  we	  do	  things	  in	  practice;	  it	  is	  not	  based	  on	  a	  prescriptive	  claim	  about	  how	  we	  should	  do	   things,	  at	   least	  not	   in	   the	   first	  instance.	   	   Some	   philosophers	   of	   physics	   have	   claimed	   in	   response	   to	   our	  argument	   that	   the	   way	   we	   present	   metaphysics	   as	   being	   done	   is	   incredibly	  inefficient,	   and	   that	   what	   we	   have	   effectively	   shown	   is	   that	   all	   metaphysics	  should	  be	  ‘made	  to	  order’	  and	  not	  simply	  taken	  ‘off	  the	  peg’	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  present.	   	  We	  ourselves	   are	   sceptical	   that	  metaphysics	  would	  proceed	  better	   in	  this	  way,	  at	   least	  in	  all	  cases;	  but	  our	  argument	  in	  any	  case	  proceeds	  from	  how	  things	  are	  done,	  for	  better	  or	  for	  worse.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  we’ll	  have	  more	  to	  say	  about	  this	  at	  the	  end.	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defence.	  	  Indeed,	  structuralists	  seem	  to	  have	  their	  work	  cut	  out	  just	  articulating	  exactly	   what	   it	   is	   that	   these	   claims	   mean	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Thus	   in	   order	   to	  maintain	  their	  position,	  structuralists	  have	  had	  to	  say,	  first,	  exactly	  what	  it	  is	  that	  they	  mean	  by	  the	  categories	  of	  ‘objects’	  ‘structure’,	  and	  ‘relations’;	  they	  have	  also	  had	   to	   explain	   precisely	  what	   they	   understand	   by	  words	   like	   ‘fundamentality’,	  	  ‘priority’,	   	   ‘derivativeness’,	   and	   ‘symmetry	   structure’	   in	   the	   context	   of	   physical	  ontology.	   	   With	   the	   meanings	   of	   these	   claims	   established	   (at	   least	   to	   some	  acceptable	  degree),	  they	  have	  then	  had	  to	  defend	  themselves	  against	  the	  gamut	  of	   objections	   that	   have	   been	   waged	   against	   them,	   including	   accusations	   of	  metaphysical	  incoherence,	  epistemic	  triviality,	  and	  their	  revival	  of	  a	  discredited	  Platonism.	  	  With	  so	  much	  work	  needing	  to	  be	  done,	  you	  might	  think,	  where	  did	  structuralists	  even	  begin?	  The	  short	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  that	  structuralists	  began	  by	  looking	  at	  extant	  
work	  in	  metaphysics,	  and	  in	  our	  view	  that	  was	  as	  good	  a	  place	  as	  any	  to	  begin.	  	  To	  give	   some	   concrete	   examples,	   to	   articulate	   the	   core	   claim	   that	   structure	   is	  ontologically	   fundamental,	   structuralists	   have	   found	   it	   useful	   to	   draw	   on	   the	  work	  of	  Kit	   Fine,	   and	   in	   particular	   his	  work	  on	  ontological	   dependence.32	   	   	   To	  articulate	  the	  relationship	  that	  they	  take	  to	  hold	  between	  symmetry	  structures,	  in	  particular,	  and	  the	  associated	  elementary	  particles,	  structuralists	  have	  found	  it	  helpful	   to	   borrow	   from	   work	   by	   Jessica	   Wilson	   on	   determinates	   vs	  determinables.33	   Ross	   Cameron’s	   theory	   of	   truthmaking	   has	   been	   invoked	   to	  communicate	   how	   radical	   structuralists	   interpret	   physicists’	   talk	   about	   objects	  while	   denying	   that	   there	   fundamentally	   are	   any.34	   	   Simon	   Saunders	   has	  appropriated	  Leibniz’s	  principle	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  indiscernibles,	  revamping	  it	  a	  
la	   Quine	   and	   extending	   to	   allow	   discernibility	   with	   respect	   to	   relations,	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   identity	   dependence	   of	   objects	   on	   relations	   in	   the	   context	   of	  quantum	  mechanics	  –	  taking	  it	  to	  articulate	  the	  ‘thin’,	  structuralist	  conception	  of	  object	  in	  the	  process.35	  	  And	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  defend	  structuralism	  against	  a	  well-­‐known	  triviality	  objection,	  known	  as	  the	  Newman	  objection,	  David	  Lewis’	  notion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  McKenzie	  2013,	  French	  2010	  33	  Wilson	  2012,	  French	  2014	  	  34	  French	  2014	  (sect.	  7.4.2.3),	  Cameron	  2008.	  35	  Cf.	  Saunders	  2003;	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  2007;	  McKenzie	  2013.	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of	   ‘elite’	   or	   ‘perfectly	   natural’	   properties	   has	   been	   taken	   to	   offer	   appropriate	  resources.36	  	  There	  are	  many	  other	  examples	  that	  we	  could	  cite	  in	  this	  connection.37	  	  But	  the	  key	   point	   is	   that	   all	   these	   metaphysical	   packages	   that	   have	   proved	   useful	   to	  appropriate	   in	   structuralism	   were	   not	   only	   (and	   by	   definition)	   created	  independently	   of	   structuralism,	   but	   were	   moreover	   (by	   and	   large)	   developed	  independently	   of	   any	   scientific	   considerations	   whatsoever.	   	   Despite	   their	  usefulness	  in	  the	  fundamental	  physics	  context,	  neither	  Kit	  Fine	  nor	  David	  Lewis,	  for	  example,	  are	  exactly	  famed	  for	  their	  engagement	  with	  science	  –	  indeed	  in	  the	  latter	   case,	   often	   quite	   the	   opposite.	   	   Cameron’s	   version	   of	   truthmaker	   theory	  was	  developed	  to	  understand	  talk	  about	  tables	  and	  chairs,	  and	  Leibniz’	  principle	  of	   the	   identity	  of	   indiscernibles	  was	  originally	  articulated	  several	  centuries	   too	  early	  to	  hope	  to	  incorporate	  the	  principles	  governing	  the	  quantum	  ontology	  that	  it	   subsequently	   helped	   to	   illuminate.	   We	   therefore	   see	   that	   scientifically	  disengaged	  metaphysics	   has,	   at	   least	   in	  many	   cases,	   provided	   us	  with	   a	   set	   of	  resources	   for	   doing	   the	   sort	   of	   metaphysics	   that	   resolutely	   does	   engage	   with	  modern	  physics.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  strikes	  us	  that	  we	  can	  and	  should	  view	  at	  least	  some	  constructions	   of	   analytic	   metaphysics	   as	   useful	   tools	   for	   shaping	   our	   own	  naturalistic	  accounts.	  	  This	  view	  of	  analytic	  metaphysics	  as	  the	  source	  of	  a	  set	  of	  resources	   that	  can	  be	  applied,	  appropriated,	  and	  generally	  used	  and	  abused	  by	  philosophers	   of	   physics	   in	   the	   process	   of	   developing	   naturalistic	   accounts,	   we	  have	  dubbed	  the	  ‘heuristic	  approach’	  to	  metaphysics.	  	  	  Indeed,	  in	  our	  view	  there	  is	  a	  neat	  analogy	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  philosophy	  of	   physics	   and	   analytic	  metaphysics,	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   physics	   itself	   and	   pure	  mathematics.	   Just	   as	   it	  was	  useful	   to	  Einstein	   that	   the	   theory	  of	  non-­‐Euclidean	  geometry	  was	   there	   for	   the	   taking	  when	   the	  moment	  arose,	   so	   it	  was	  useful	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	   	   See	  Melia	   and	   Saatsi	   2006	   for	   discussion,	   but	   also	   Saunders	   and	  McKenzie	  forthcoming.	  37	  Outwith	  the	  context	  of	  structuralist	  philosophy	  of	  physics,	  we	  might	  mention	  how	  Meinard	  Kuhlmann	  (2010)	  has	  appropriated	   the	   trope	  ontologies	  of	  Keith	  Campbell	  and	  Peter	  Simons	  in	  the	  context	  of	  algebraic	  quantum	  field	  theory,	  and	  how	  Michael	  Esfeld,	  Mauro	  Dorato	  and	  others	  have	  appealed	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  dispositional	  properties	  developed	  by	  Mumford	  and	  Bird	   to	   interpret	   the	  GRW	  approach	  to	  quantum	  mechanics	  (Dorato	  and	  Esfeld	  2010).	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eliminative	  structuralists	  that	  there	  has	  been	  developed	  a	  theory	  of	  dependence	  compatible	  with	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  dependent	  entity.	  Likewise,	  just	  as	  it	  was	  useful	  for	  the	  development	  of	  particle	  physics	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  Lie	  groups	  was	  largely	   completed	   by	   the	   time	   the	   appropriately	   high-­‐energy	   regimes	   could	   be	  probed,	  so	   it	  was	  beneficial	   to	   the	  defender	  of	   the	  Everett	   interpretation	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  personal	  identity	  that	  makes	  decision-­‐making	  make	  sense	  in	  branching	  universes	  was	   already	   on	   the	  market38.	   	   And	   just	   as	   it	  was	   fortuitous	   that	   the	  theory	   of	   imaginary	   numbers	   was	   fit	   for	   use	   at	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   quantum	  revolution,	   so	   it	  has	  proved	  useful	   that	  various	  metaphysical	  packages	  were	   in	  place	  to	  provide	  possible	  frameworks	  for	  its	  interpretation,	  including	  Saunders’	  form	  of	  Leibniz’s	  PII	  but	  also	   theories	   involving	  haecceities.39	  Now,	   to	  be	  clear,	  nothing	   in	   this	  analogy	   is	  supposed	  to	  discourage	   the	  development	  of	   ‘made	  to	  order’	  frameworks	  that	  engage	  (more	  or	  less)	  directly	  with	  the	  physics,	  such	  as	  the	   metaphysics	   of	   non-­‐individuals	   and	   the	   associated	   formalism	   of	   quasi-­‐set	  theory	   –	   any	   more	   than	   physicists	   should	   be	   discouraged	   from	   developing	  mathematics	  as	  and	  when	  new	  empirical	  situations	  arise.40	  	  But	  nonetheless,	  just	  as	  areas	  of	  pure	  mathematics	  subsequently	  proved	  useful	  in	  physics	  it	  cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  empirically	  disengaged	  metaphysics	  has	  in	  the	  past	  proved	  useful	  to	  philosophers	   of	   physics.	   	   And	   given	   that	   the	   deliverances	   of	   17th	   century,	  rationalist	  metaphysician	  have	  been	  usefully	  appropriated	  by	  the	  philosopher	  of	  quantum	  physics,	  it	  seems	  it	  would	  be	  folly	  to	  try	  to	  predict	  in	  advance	  what	  will	  and	  will	  not	  prove	  similarly	  useful	  in	  the	  course	  of	  time.	  	  In	  our	  view,	  then,	  scientifically	  disengaged	  metaphysics	  can	  and	  has	  performed	  a	  useful	   function	   in	  naturalistic	   contexts,	   since	   it	  provides	  us	  with	   raw	  materials	  from	  which	  our	  own	  theories	  can	  be	  developed.	  And	  once	  that	  much	  is	  conceded,	  we	   think	   that	   it	   becomes	   very	   problematic	   to	   baldly	   assert	   that	   it	   should	   be	  “discontinued”.	  	  It	  seems,	  rather,	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  to	  simply	  bite	  the	  hand	  that	  feeds	  us.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	   Of	   course,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   relevant	   mathematics	   was	   developed	   entirely	  independently	  from	  the	  physical	  context	  (see	  Bueno	  and	  French	  forthcoming).	  	  39	  See	  French	  and	  Krause	  2006.	  40	  Ibid.	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4.	  Reining	  in	  the	  Metaphysics	  
	  The	   above	   considerations	   in	   support	   of	   analytic	   metaphysics	   undermine	   the	  most	   extreme	   claims	   regarding	   scientifically	   disengaged	   metaphysics.	   	   But	   it	  must	  now	  be	   acknowledged	   that	   there	   seems	   to	  be	   a	   tension	   in	  what	  we	  have	  said	   so	   far.	   	   We	   opened	   up	   this	   paper	   with	   a	   litany	   of	   grievances	   that	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  have	  had	  against	  analytic	  metaphysicians,	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  these	  remain	  as	  strong	  grounds	  for	  deploring	  analytic	  metaphysics	  as	  currently	   practiced.	   	   We	   then	   said,	   however,	   that	   analytic	   metaphysics	   had	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  naturalistic	  metaphysics,	  and	  that	  it	   is	  to	  be	  valued	  for	  that	  reason.	  So	  are	  we	  with	  the	  analytic	  metaphysicians,	  or	  against	  them?	  	  However	  –	  and	  not	  unusually	  for	  a	  dichotomy	  –	  this	  last	  ultimatum	  is	  much	  too	  simplistic.	  It	  should	  be	  obvious	  that	  disavowing	  blanket	  statements	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  all	  contemporary	  work	  in	  an	  area	  is	  worthless	  and	  should	  be	  abandoned	  is	  compatible	  with	   regarding	   some	   of	   that	  work	   in	  precisely	   that	  way;	  and	   it	  was	  such	  a	  differential	   attitude	   that	  we	  ourselves	  proposed	   in	  Thinking	  Outside	   the	  
Toolbox.	   But	   if	   this	   is	   the	   attitude	   that	   one	   wants	   to	   take,	   then	   one	   is	   clearly	  obliged	  to	  say	  what	  it	  is	  about	  the	  offending	  cases	  that	  makes	  them	  offensive,	  and	  what	  it	   is	  about	  the	  acceptable	  cases	  that	  gets	  them	  off	  the	  hook.	   	  So	  given	  that	  the	   considerations	   of	   the	   last	   section	   suggest	   sanctioning	   some	   metaphysical	  projects,	   although	   we	   have	   as	   yet	   no	   clear	   reason	   to	   say	   all,	   let	   us	   make	   a	  normative	   distinction	   to	   siphon	   such	   projects	   into	   two	   classes,	  which	  we	   shall	  	  (somewhat	  artlessly)	  call	  ‘Type	  I’	  and	  ‘Type	  II’:	  	  
Type	   I:	  metaphysics	   that	   is	   scientifically	   disinterested	   and	   that,	   at	   least	  
prima	  facie,	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  be	  so	  interested,	  or	  even	  that	  might	  have	  to	  be	  so	  disinterested41;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  are	  staying	  quiet	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  body	  of	  metaphysics	   that	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   legitimate	   enquiry	   but	   to	   which	   science	  could	   not	   contribute	   in	   principle,	   so	   that	   such	   metaphysics	   would	   have	   to	   be	  scientifically	   disinterested.	   	   This	   issue	   however	   is	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	  McKenzie,	  ‘The	  Plurality	  of	  Priority’	  (in	  preparation).	  	  See	  also	  Bealer	  1987.	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Type	  II:	  metaphysics	  that	  is	  disinterested	  but	  that	  should	  not	  be.	  	  	  	  Clearly,	   Type	   I	   metaphysics	   is	   the	  metaphysics	   that	   we	  want	   to	   protect,	   want	  regarded	   as	   legitimate,	   despite	   its	   disengagement	   from	   science;	   Type	   II	   is	   that	  which	  we	  wish	  to	  be	  cast	  to	  the	  flames.	   	  But	  while	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  normative	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  here,	  the	  grounds	  on	  which	  the	  distinction	  is	  to	  be	  drawn	  are	  less	  so.	  	  How	  are	  the	  two	  types	  to	  be	  identified?	  	  	  Since	   the	  aim,	  presumably,	   is	   to	   come	   to	   some	  sort	  of	   reflective	  equilibrium	   in	  our	   judgments,	   let’s	   start	   off	   just	   trying	   to	   characterize	   the	   two	   types	  extensionally.	   	   Beginning	   with	   metaphysics	   of	   Type	   I,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   this	  category	  pertains	  to	  the	  ‘good’	  metaphysics	  that	  we	  think	  can	  be	  defended,	  and	  if	  we	   go	   with	   what	   we’ve	   said	   about	   the	   role	   of	   analytic	   metaphysics	   in	  structuralism	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  anything	  that	  has	  demonstrated	  its	  usefulness	  in	  
naturalistic	   contexts	   should	   be	   filed	   into	   this	   category.	   	   Thus	   into	   Type	   I	   go	  Leibniz’s	  PII,	  Fine’s	  theory	  of	  ontological	  dependence,	  and	  whatever	  it	  was	  that	  Lewis	   said	   about	   ‘eliteness’	   that	   helped	   block	   the	   triviality	   objections	   to	  structuralism.42	   Into	  Type	  II,	  by	  contrast,	  will	  get	   filed	  the	  metaphysics	  that	  we	  vilified	   at	   the	   outset	   –	   so	   that,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   Lewis’	   assertion	   that	   the	  fundamental	   level	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   ‘mosaic’	   of	   local	   matters	   of	   fact,	  Markosian’s	   debate	   over	   whether	   the	   fundamental	   entities	   are	   pointlike	   or	  continuous,	  and	  the	  debate	  in	  modal	  metaphysics	  over	  whether	  quarks	  can	  freely	  recombine,	  will	   all	   feature	  here.43	   	  These,	   recall,	  were	   regarded	  as	  problematic	  on	  account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  not	  paying	  sufficient	  attention	  to	  science.	  Whatever	   it	   is	   that	   ultimately	   grounds	   the	   distinction	   between	   two	   classes,	   it	  strikes	   us	   that	   the	   above	   examples	   should	   be	   classed	   as	   they	   are.	   	   So	   now	  we	  must	  ask	  what	   it	   is	   about,	   in	  particular,	   those	  examples	   classed	  as	  Type	   II	   that	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  they	  should	  have	  engaged	  with	  some	  relevant	  science,	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  however,	  the	  ‘elite’	  properties	  are	  taken	  to	  have	  more	  features	   than	   this	   in	   Lewis’	   system,	   and	   not	   all	   the	   claims	   Lewis	   made	   about	  them	  will	  end	  up	  in	  being	  classified	  as	  Type	  I.	  43	   Lewis’	   assertion	   that	   has	   of	   course	   come	   under	   withering	   attack	   by	   	   many	  philosophers	  of	  physics;	  see	  e.g.	  Maudlin	  2007.	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though	  they	  did	  not,	  given	  that	  we	  don’t	  insist	  on	  any	  and	  all	  metaphysics	  doing	  so?	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  reason	  that	  these	  projects	  in	  particular	  strike	  us	  as	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  that	  should	  engage	  with	  science	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  is	  simply	  that	  they	  
putatively	  refer	  to	   things	   that	   itself	   science	   is	  directly	  concerned	  with.44	  After	  all,	  these	  projects	  are	  all	   taken	  to	  concern	  the	  ontologically	   fundamental,	  and	  given	  physicalism	  –	   commitment	   to	  which	   “is	   about	  as	   close	   to	  a	  bit	  of	  orthodoxy	  as	  one	  will	   find	   in	   contemporary	   philosophy”45	   –	  metaphysicians	   themselves	  will	  claim	   that	   the	   fundamental	   regimes	   of	   the	  world	   are	   going	   to	   be	   described	   by	  physics,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  they	  will	  be	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  described	  at	  all.	  	  But	  it	  seems	  obvious	   that	  one	  cannot	  simply	  postulate	   that	   things	  described	   in	  physics	  have	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  features:	  one	  has	  to	  actually	  check	  that	  they	  do	  in	  fact	  have	  those	  features,	  or	  at	   least	   that	   they	  can	  be	  reasonably	  claimed	   to,	  and	  moreover	   that	  one	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  do	  have	  those	  features	  if	  the	  physics	   seems	   to	   contradict	   it.	   Moreover	   –	   at	   least	   when	   we	   wrote	   Thinking	  
Outside	   the	   Toolbox	   –	   it	   struck	   us	   as	   entirely	   uncontroversial	   that	   one	   should	  demand	  of	  metaphysicians	  that	  they	  incorporate	  the	  relevant	  findings	  of	  science	  regarding	   the	   entities	   they	   are	   interested	   in,	  whenever	   there	   are	   such	   findings.	  	  After	   all,	   here	  we	   are	   simply	   echoing	  Dummett’s	   lament	   that	   ‘the	   generality	   of	  philosophers	   [fail	   to]	   take	   due	   account	   of	   physical	   theories	   when	   addressing	  problems	  on	  which	  they	  bear'.	  	  And	  how	  could	  one	  possibly	  take	  issue	  with	  that?	  To	  a	  first	  approximation,	  then,	  let	  us	  say	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  metaphysics	  that	   results	   in	   its	   being	   classed	   as	   of	   the	   problematic,	   Type	   II	   sort	   is	   that	   it	  violates	  the	  compatibility	  principle:	  	  
The	  compatibility	  principle:	  the	  constraint	  that	  any	  metaphysical	  theory	  invoking	   entities	   x	   and	   deployed	   at	   some	   time	   t	   should	   be	   compatible	  with	   at	   least	   some	   independent,	   well-­‐supported,	   overall	   `serious'	  scientific	   theory	   that	   directly	   describes	   or	   that	   is	   otherwise	   relevant	   to	  those	  entities,	  should	  such	  a	  theory	  exist	  at	  that	  time.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  We	  might	  say	   that	   they	  concern	  physical	  ontology	   in	  addition	  to	  what	  would	  normally	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  that	  ontology.	  45	  Hall	  2010.	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To	  repeat,	   this	  principle	   (or	  something	   like	   it)	   should	  strike	  one	  as	  prima	   facie	  basically	   unobjectionable.	   	   But	   let	   us	   make	   a	   few	   further	   comments	   about	   it.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  principle	  is	  clearly	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  first	  approximation:	  we	  do	  not	  ultimately	   want	   to	   formulate	   a	   principle	   so	   strong	   that	   philosophers	   can	   only	  ever	  hope	  to	  be	  supplicants	  at	  the	  door	  of	  science,	  never	  ever	  to	  be	  permitted	  to	  contradict	   received	   scientific	   views	   on	   what	   it	   is	   that	   science	   is	   telling	   us.	  	  Nevertheless,	  we	  think	  we	  can	  expect	  such	  cases	  to	  be	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	   rule;	   so	   let	   us	   insist	   on	   adherence	   to	   the	   compatibility	   principle	   as	  formulated	  above	  in	  at	  least	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases.	  	  Secondly,	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  project	  in	  metaphysics	  is	  legitimate	  or	  not	  –	  that	  is,	  is	  to	  be	  cast	  as	  Type	  I	  or	  not	  –	  is	  a	  feature	  that	  can	  change	  with	  time.	  	  That	  seems	  right:	  what	  was	  defensible	  metaphysics	  in	  the	  18th	  century	  will	  not	  in	  general	  be	  defensible	  today.	  	  Thirdly,	  given	   the	   difficulties	   in	   interpreting	   physical	   theories,	   respecting	   the	  compatibility	  principle	  still	   leaves	  an	  abundance	  of	  space	  for	  metaphysicians	  to	  disagree	   on	   how	   to	   conceive	   of	   fundamental	   ontology.	   	   That	   is	   of	   course	  unfortunate	   from	  a	   certain	  point	  of	   view,	  but	  also	   strikes	  us	  as	  philosophically	  ‘healthy’.	  	  	  Fourthly,	   however	   –	   and	   most	   pertinently	   for	   current	   purposes	   –	   while	   we	  intend	  the	  compatibility	  principle	  to	  disqualify	  many	  metaphysical	  projects	  from	  being	   legitimate	   objects	   of	   serious	   debate,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   in	   other	   respects	  generous.	   	   For	   example,	   if	   one	   could	   claim	   that	   no	   conceivable	   answer	   to	   the	  special	  composition	  question	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  incompatible	  with	  the	  science	  that	  we	  currently	  have,	  then	  debate	  over	  this	  question	  may	  (at	  least	  thus	  far)	  be	  regarded	  as	  belonging	  in	  the	  legitimate,	  Type	  I	  class.	  If	  there	  are	  more	  robustly	  naturalistic	   metaphysicians	   who	   feel	   that	   that	   just	   means	   the	   compatibility	  principle,	  while	  excluding	  some	  things,	  does	  not	  exclude	  enough,	  then	  recall	  that	  we	   are	   here	   trying	   to	   make	   space	   for	   scientifically	   disinterested	   metaphysics,	  given	   our	   observations	   regarding	   the	   practices	   in	   philosophy	   of	   physics;	   those	  who	  think	  that	  is	  too	  lenient	  are	  of	  course	  welcome	  to	  develop	  more	  demanding	  proposals.	   	   Note,	   however,	   that	   the	   problems	   we	   raised	   for	   the	   special	  composition	   question	   concerned	   not	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   science	   with	  assumptions	   made	   about	   the	   debated	   ontology,	   but	   rather	   the	   reliance	   on	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intuition	  when	  conducting	  debates	  about	   it.46	   	  Thus	   the	  problems	  voiced	  above	  concerned	  not	  so	  much	  the	  assumptions	  made	  about	  what	  was	  debated,	  so	  much	  as	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  debate	  was	  conducted	  and	  the	  associated	  standards	  of	  evidence.	   	   And	   while	   the	   reliance	   on	   intuition	   certainly	   does	   strike	   us	   as	  problematic,	  we	   are	   also	   acutely	   aware	   that	  we	   do	   not	   have	   a	  well-­‐developed	  epistemology	   of	   metaphysics	   in	   general	   (nor,	   indeed,	   of	   mathematics),	   and	   as	  such	  we	   fear	   that	   if	  we	   disqualify	   the	   debate	   over	   this	   question	  merely	   for	   its	  reliance	  on	  intuition,	  then	  we	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  throwing	  out	  the	  naturalistic	  baby	  with	   the	   analytical	   bathwater.47	   	   In	   any	   case,	   that	   discussion	   over	   what	  (epistemological)	   principles	   should	   be	   added	   to	   our	   (ontological)	   demand	   of	  compatibility	  with	  science	  is	  one	  for	  another	  day.	  At	  this	  stage,	  then,	  we	  take	  the	  compatibility	  principle	  to	  disqualify	  many	  extant	  non-­‐naturalistic	  metaphysical	  projects	  as	   legitimate	  ways	   to	  occupy	  one’s	   time,	  while	  not	  taking	  it	  to	  disqualify	  all	  such	  projects.	  	  And	  just	  to	  repeat,	  although	  we	  could	   appreciate	   the	   view	   that	   in	   demanding	  mere	   compatibility	   we	   have	   not	  gone	   far	   enough,	   it	   is	   our	   aim	   to	   formulate	   a	   principle	   that	   rules	   out	   certain	  projects	  while	   being	   otherwise	   lenient.	   	   Some	   such	   generosity	   is	   deserved,	  we	  have	   argued,	   given	   our	   observations	   regarding	   the	   appropriation	   of	   plenty	   of	  scientifically	   disinterested	  metaphysics	   in	   the	   service	   of	   philosophy	  of	   physics,	  observations	  that	  prompt	  taking	  what	  we	  have	  called	  the	  ‘heuristic	  approach’	  to	  metaphysics.	  As	  stated	  at	  the	  outset,	  however,	  we	  are	  now	  worried	  that	  this	  ‘half-­‐way	  house’	  attitude	  to	  metaphysics	  is	  fundamentally	  unstable.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  are	  worried	  that	   insistence	   on	   the	   compatibility	   principle	   is	   actually	   inconsistent	   with	   the	  heuristic	  approach	  to	  metaphysics.	   	   	  Since	  the	  compatibility	  principle	  strikes	  us	  as	  completely	  unobjectionable,	  and	  since	  (something	  like)	  the	  heuristic	  approach	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This	  of	  course	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  no	  conceivable	  ontological	  objections	  that	  one	  could	  make	  to	  the	  debate	  around	  the	  SCQ;	  see	  for	  example	  the	  criticisms	  in	   Ladyman	   and	   Ross	   (2007,	   p.	   21),	   and	   McKenzie	   and	   Muller	   (unpublished).	  	  Our	  point	  here	  is	  simply	  that	  the	  problems	  we	  cited	  above	  concerning	  the	  debate	  around	  this	  issue	  were	  not	  these	  same	  problems.	  	  47	   Empiricists	   of	   course	   will	   be	   perfectly	   happy	   with	   this	   conclusion,	   but	   as	  naturalistic	   metaphysicians	   we	   are	   operating	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	  metaphysics	  that	  is	  somehow	  ‘continuous’	  with	  science	  is	  in	  better	  shape.	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to	  metaphysics	   seems	   likewise	   unassailable	   given	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy	   of	  physics	  as	  practiced,	  this	  situation	  strikes	  us	  as	  verging	  on	  the	  paradoxical.	  	  But	  before	  we	  explain	  what	  we	  take	  this	  perceived	  instability	  to	  consist	  in,	  and	  what	  we	   think	   we	   should	   say	   in	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   it	   will	   be	   helpful	   to	   discuss	   how	  metaphysicians	   themselves	   have	   responded	   to	   the	   allegation	   that	   their	   work	  violates	   (something	   like)	   the	   compatibility	   principle,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   deeply	  problematic	  in	  consequence.	  	  
5.	  Metaphysicians	  Defend	  Metaphysics	  A	  common	  response	  of	  metaphysicians	   to	   the	  claim	  that	   their	  work	   flies	   in	   the	  face	  of	  science	  is,	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  to	  simply	  deny	  that	  they	  are	  talking	  exclusively	  or	  even	  predominantly	  about	   the	  entities	   that	  are	  described	   in	  science,	   in	  spite	  of	  what	  may	  be	  initial	  appearances.	  	  According	  to	  them,	  while	  science	  can	  talk	  only	  of	   what	   is	   actual,	   what	   they	   are	   discussing	   are	   possible	   entities,	   and	   as	   such	  things	   of	  which	   science,	   as	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   actual,	   knows	   only	   a	   tiny	  fragment.	  Such	   a	   move	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   a	   general	   shift	   that	   has	   taken	   place	   in	  metaphysicians’	   own	   conception	   of	   metaphysics	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   20th	  century:	  whereas	   the	   classical	   view	   of	   philosophy	   is	   as	   the	   search	   for	  what	   is	  necessarily	  the	  case,	  metaphysics	  is	  now	  more	  often	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  investigation	   into	  possibility	   generally.	  That	   this	   is	   the	   case	   is	  made	  explicit	   in	  places	   in	   the	   ‘metametaphysical’	   literature:	   according	   to	   Conee	   and	   Sider,	   for	  example,	  	  Metaphysics	   is	   about	   the	   most	   explanatory	   basic	   necessities	   and	  
possibilities.	   	   Metaphysics	   is	   about	   what	   could	   be	   and	   what	   must	   be.	  	  Except	   incidentally,	   metaphysics	   is	   not	   about	   explanatorily	   ultimate	  aspects	  of	  reality	  that	  are	  actual…48	  	  	  Similarly,	  according	  to	  Lowe:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Conee	  and	  Sider	  2005,	  203.	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   metaphysics	  may	  […]	  be	  characterized	  as	  the	  science	  of	  the	  possible,	  charged	  with	  charting	  the	  domain	  of	  objective	  or	  real	  possibility	  […]	  All	  metaphysics	  is	  implicitly	  modal,	  because	  it	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  kinds	  of	  things	  are	  possible	  or	  compossible,	  and	  only	  subsequently	  with	  what	  kinds	  of	  things	  are	  actual.49	  	  	  	  But	  if	  this	  is	  how	  analytic	  metaphysicians	  now	  conceive	  of	  their	  discipline,	  then	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  one	  may	  be	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  any	  apparent	  conflict	  with	  the	  compatibility	  principle	  may	  be	  effaced	  at	  a	  stroke.	  	  To	  be	  explicit:	  while	  today’s	  metaphysicians	  are	  predominantly	  focused	  on	  the	  ontologically	  fundamental,	  and	  while	  the	  vast	  majority	  are	  physicalists	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  actual	  world,	  when	  accused	  of	  conflict	  with	  actual	  science	  those	  metaphysicians	  may	  claim	  that	  the	  fundamental	  entities	  they	  are	  theorizing	  about	  are	  entities	  of	  another	  
world.	  	  The	  net	  result	  of	  this,	  it	  appears,	  is	  that	  nothing	  discussed	  in	  metaphysics	  need	  ever	  fall	  foul	  of	  the	  compatibility	  principle,	  and	  all	  metaphysics	  is	  automatically	  recast	  as	  the	  legitimate,	  Type	  I	  class	  by	  our	  criterion.	  	  	  	  How	  compelling	  is	  this	  move?	  	  Does	  the	  idea	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  ‘the	  science	  of	  the	  possible’	  	  represent	  a	  get-­‐out-­‐of-­‐jail-­‐free	  card	  for	  analytic	  metaphysicians	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  complaints	  of	  Ladyman	  et	  al.?	  50	  	  We	  ourselves	  are	  pessimistic.	  	  Here	  we	  will	  enumerate	  just	  a	  few	  reasons	  why	  we	  remain	  distinctly	  unimpressed	  by	  this	  move.	  
 i.	   It’s	   unconvincing.	   	   Lewis’	   assumption	   of	   locality,	   Markosian’s	   debate	   over	  maximally	   continuous	   vs	   ‘pointy’	   matter,	   and	   the	   debate	   over	   the	  recombinability	   of	   quarks	   all	   have	   one	   feature	   in	   common:	   they	   all	   assume	  manifestly	   classical	   concepts	  when	  debating	  what	   they	   regard	   as	   fundamental.	  	  But	   if	   metaphysics	   is	   all	   about	   possibility	   space	   generally,	   then	   why	   does	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Lowe	  2011,	  100;	  106.	  50	  This	  phrase	  is	  first	  used,	  to	  our	  knowledge,	  in	  Russell	  (1919);	  given	  the	  earlier	  quote	   from	   Ladyman	   and	   Ross	   concerning	   Russell’s	   revolt,	   this	   situation	   is	  somewhat	  ironic!	  	  For	  an	  example	  of	  the	  contrasting	  view,	  see	  Bealer	  1987.	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everything	  look	  so	  classical?51	  	  Presumably,	  if	  we	  take	  possibility	  space	  seriously	  then	  somewhere	   in	   it	   there	  are	  entities	  at	   least	   as	   complicated	  as	   the	  Lorentz-­‐invariant	  smorgasbords	  of	  probability	  functions	  that	  one	  finds	  in	  quantum	  field	  theory.	   	   Why,	   then,	   are	   entities	   of	   comparable	   complexity	   not	   discussed	   and	  debated?	  	  Could	  it	  be	  that	  metaphysicians	  are	  only	  saying	  that	  they	  are	  interested	  in	   possibility	   generally	   to	   mask	   their	   unwillingness	   to	   forfeit	   the	   classical	  assumptions	  that	  make	  their	  life	  so	  much	  easier?	  ii.	  The	  literature	  suggests	  that	  conceivability	  implies	  possibility.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  cases	  cited	  as	  possibilities	  and	  taken	  seriously	  as	  such	  in	  analytic	  metaphysics	  –	  such	  as	  the	  existence	  of	  infinitely	  continuous	  matter	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  gunk	  –	  do	  not	   follow,	  or	  at	   the	  very	   least	  are	  not	  presented	  as	   following,	   from	  systematic	  modal	   assumptions.	   Rather,	   they	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   possibilities	   merely	   because	  they	  can	  be	  conceived.	  	  But	  to	  hold	  that	  whatever	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  is	  possible	  is	  to	  assume	  the	  ‘conceivability	  implies	  possibility’	   link	  that	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  much	  scrutiny,	  especially	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Kripke.52	   	  As	  such,	  we	  feel	  that	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   is	   very	  much	   on	   the	  metaphysician	  who	  would	   claim	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  humans	  conceive	  things	  in	  thought	  may	  be	  relied	   upon	   to	   provide	   us	   with	   evidence	   for	   what	   is	   metaphysically,	   and	   not	  merely	  epistemically,	  possible.	  Furthermore,	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  Lewis	  made	  such	  an	   impact	   on	   modal	   metaphysics	   suggests	   that	   metaphysicians	   themselves	  would	  ideally	  like	  to	  be	  more	  systematic	  in	  their	  theorizing	  than	  they	  would	  be	  were	   they	   to	   merely	   exercise	   their	   imaginations,	   given	   that	   Lewis	   explicitly	  rejects	   the	   idea	   that	   “every	   seemingly	   possible	   description	   or	   conception	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	   And	   again	   we	   take	   the	   point	   –	   noted	   by	   a	   referee	   –	   that	   Lewis	   took	   his	  pointillism	   to	   be	   a	   contingent	   thesis.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   we	   have	   said,	   many	  metaphysicians	  have	  happily	  ploughed	  this	  particular	  furrow	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  that	  the	  thesis	  might	  not	  only	  be	  contingent	  but	  actually	  false.	  52	  See	  Bird	  2007.	  	  (This	  objection	  is	  of	  course	  related	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  reliance	  on	  intuition	  in	  metaphysics.)	   	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  conceivability	  and	  possibility	  and	  of	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	  former	  might	  be	  defeasible	  (cf.	  Chalmers	  2002,	  Yablo	  1993).	  	  The	  upshot	  of	  such	  considerations	  –	  or	  so	  it	  seems	  to	  us	  –	  is	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  different	  frameworks	  of	  possibility,	  each	  dependent	  on	  the	  afore-­‐mentioned	  relation	  plus	  defeasibility	  factors,	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  the	  modal	  claims	  of	  analytic	  metaphysicians	  should	  be	  indexed.	  How	  that	  then	  might	  bear	  on	  our	  account	  is	  a	  subject	  for	  another	  essay.	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world	  does	  fit	  some	  world”	  (as	  of	  course	  he	  must	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  a	  role	  for	  his	  theory).53	  	  But	  if	  Lewis	  is	  to	  be	  our	  model	  of	  how	  to	  be	  systematic	  in	  our	  modal	  theorizing,	   then	   that	  offers	  up	  yet	  another	  reason	  as	   to	  why	   the	   ‘science	  of	   the	  possible’	   move	   does	   not	   relieve	   metaphysicians	   of	   having	   to	   attend	   to	   actual	  science,	  for	  the	  following	  reason.	  	  
iii.	   Systematic	   theories	   of	   possibility	   space	   can	   be	   falsified	   by	   actual	  
physics.	  Lewis’	  possible	  world	  analysis	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  best	  –	  indeed	  for	   some	   the	   only	   –	   systematic	   theory	   of	   possibility	   on	   the	   market.	   But	   the	  tenability	   of	   Lewis’	   system	   rests	   on	   some	   non-­‐trivial	   assumptions	   about	  fundamental	   properties:	   in	   particular,	   the	   assumption	   that	   all	   the	   fundamental	  properties	   are	   intrinsic.	   	   Such	   an	   assumption	   is	   crucial	   for	   Lewis,	   for	   only	   if	  properties	   are	   intrinsic	   will	   they	   be	   open	   to	   free	   recombination,	   and	   it	   is	   the	  principle	   of	   recombination	   applied	   to	   fundamental	   properties	   that	   is	   the	  generator	   of	   Lewisian	   possible	   worlds.54	   As	   such,	   the	   free	   recombinability	   of	  fundamental	   properties	   is	   a	   sine	   qua	   non	   of	   his	   whole	   system.	   But	   if	   all	   the	  fundamental	   properties	   are	   to	   be	   intrinsic	   and	   freely	   recombinable,	   that	   of	  course	  means	  that	  all	  the	  this-­‐worldly	  fundamental	  properties	  in	  particular	  must	  be;	   and	  by	  physicalism,	   that	  means	   that	   all	   the	   fundamental	  physics	   properties	  have	  to	  have	  these	  features.	  	  That	  the	  fundamental	  physics	  properties	  do	  indeed	  have	  these	  features	  is	  something	  Lewis	  himself	  never	  investigates	  or	  makes	  any	  real	   attempt	   to	   justify.55	   	   But	   there	   is	   in	   fact	   good	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   the	  fundamental	   physics	   properties	   are	   not	   in	   general	   freely	   recombinable,	   since	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Lewis	  p	  87.	  	  Lewis	  himself	  claimed	  that	  buying	  into	  the	  conceivability	  implies	  possibility	   link	   “indiscriminately	   endorses	   offhand	   opinion	   about	   what	   is	  possible”	  (ibid.),	  but	  given	  the	  detailed	  literature	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  conceiving	  in	  this	   context	   we	   can	   imagine	   many	   philosophers	   taking	   issue	   with	   that	  characterization	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  	  54	   	   It	   is	   because	   this	   principle	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   expressible	   in	   language	  devoid	   of	  modal	  concepts	  that	  is	  taken	  to	  secure	  the	  reductive	  character	  of	  his	  theory	  –	  the	  feature	  standardly	  understood	  to	  earn	   it	   the	  accolade	   ‘best’	  (cf	  Sider	  2003,	  Sec.	  3.5).	  	  Note	  that	  intrinsicality	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  free	  recombination,	  making	  the	  latter	  the	  stronger	  assumption.	  55	   Once	   again,	   we	   acknowledge	   the	   point	   that,	   in	   response	   to	   quantum	  mechanics,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  he	  does	  contemplate	  the	  suggestion	  that	  there	  might	  be	  actual	  fundamental	  non-­‐spatio-­‐temporal	  external	  relations.	  Nevertheless,	  see	  what	  he	  says	  at	  Lewis	  (1983),	  16;	  (1986),	  61.	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there	   is	   good	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   they	   are	   not	   intrinsic	   –	   at	   least	   not	   qua	  
fundamental	  properties.56	  Our	   support	  of	   this	   claim	  must	  here	  be	   confined	   to	  a	  thumbnail	  sketch,	  but	  our	  argument	  is	  basically	  this.57	  	  Our	   most	   fundamental	   framework	   for	   physics	   (at	   least	   at	   the	   moment)	   is	  quantum	   field	   theory	   (QFT).58	   	   In	   this	   framework,	   the	  magnitudes	   of	   physical	  properties,	  such	  as	  mass	  and	  electric	  charge,	  can	  change	  with	  the	  energy	  scale	  in	  a	   way	   that	   is	   described	   by	   the	   renormalization	   group	   equation	   (or	   ‘Callan-­‐Symanzik’	   equation).	   	   Furthermore,	   since	   spacetime	   is	   represented	   as	  continuous	   in	   QFT,	   according	   to	   this	   framework	   there	   is	   no	   limit	   to	   how	   high	  these	   energy	   scales	   can	   grow.59	   	   It	   follows	   that	   properties	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	  fundamental	   in	   this	   framework	   only	   if	   they	   stay	   mathematically	   well-­‐defined,	  and	   thus	   finite	   in	   magnitude,	   in	   the	   infinite-­‐energy	   limit.	   	   This	   turns	   out,	  however,	   to	   be	   an	   extremely	   demanding	   requirement,	   and	   there	   is	   reason	   to	  think	   that	   it	   is	   satisfied	   only	   if	   the	   property	   occurs	   in	   a	   local	   gauge	   theory	  containing	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  fermion	  types.60	  	  For	  example,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	   In	   our	   previous	   paper	   we	   argued	   for	   this	   conclusion	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  considerations	   from	   gauge	   theory	   –	   considerations	   that	   a	   respondent	   argued	  simply	   begged	   the	   question	   at	   hand	   (see	   Livanios	   2012).	   	  While	   that	   criticism	  was	   correct	   and	   legitimate	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   original	   presentation	   of	   our	  argument,	   we	   nevertheless	   think	   that	   our	   conclusion	   still	   stands.	   	   What	   was	  missing	  from	  our	  earlier	  argument	  was	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  constraints	  that	  are	  placed	  on	   fundamental	  properties	   in	  particular:	   it	   is	   fundamentality	  constraints	  that	  necessitate	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  fundamental	  constituents	  of	  matter	  and	  gauge	  bosons.	  	  	  57	  This	  argument	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  McKenzie	  (ms).	  58	   It	   should	   be	   pointed	   out	   as	   well	   that	   we	   do	   not	   think	   that	   focusing	   our	  discussion	   on	   laws	   and	   properties	   as	   they	   are	   represented	   in	   quantum	   field	  theory	   in	   particular	   –	   and	   thus	   not	   some	   other	   assumed	   ‘possible’	   physical	  framework	   –	   need	   beg	   any	   questions.	   	   For	   discussion,	   see	   McKenzie	   (2014),	  Section	  4.	  59	  The	  continuity	  assumption	  might	  of	  course	  be	  given	  up	  in	  a	  quantum	  theory	  of	  gravity.	  	  But	  for	  the	  moment	  QFT	  is	  the	  best	  we	  have,	  and	  naturalism	  enjoins	  us	  to	   take	   it	   seriously.	   	   There	   is	   also	   increasing	   optimism	   that	   gravity	   can	   be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  basic	  framework	  of	  QFT,	  though	  what	  exactly	  that	  entails	  for	  spacetime	  continuity	  is	  a	  complicated	  issue	  on	  which	  we	  won’t	  speculate.	  60	   This	   is	   because	   these	   properties	   are	   required	   in	   order	   for	   a	   theory	   to	   be	  asymptotically	  free.	  	  While	  there	  is	  a	  more	  general	  class	  of	  fundamental	  theories	  (namely,	   the	   asymptotically	   safe	   theories),	   this	   is	   only	   class	   that	   is	   tractable	  enough	  for	  us	  to	  investigate	  at	  present.	  	  Again,	  see	  McKenzie	  (ms)	  for	  discussion.	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the	  colour	  charge	  on	  a	  quark	  will	  behave	  as	  a	  fundamental	  property	  if,	  but	  only	  if,	  (1)	  there	  exist	  gluons	  in	  addition	  to	  quarks,	  and	  (2)	  there	  are	  at	  most	  16	  distinct	  types,	   or	   ‘flavours’,	   of	   quarks	   in	   the	   theory.61	   	   Should	   there	   be	   more	   flavours	  present,	   the	   colour	   charge	  will	   diverge	   in	   the	   limit	   so	   that	   it	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  regarded	  as	   fundamental	   after	  all.	   It	   follows	   from	  all	   this	   that	   the	   fundamental	  physics	   properties	   cannot	   in	   general	   be	   regarded	   as	   intrinsic,	   at	   least	   not	  qua	  
fundamental	   properties;	   for	   the	   very	   fundamentality	   of	   such	   properties	   can	   be	  sensitive	  to	  what	  exists	  in	  addition	  to	  any	  given	  bearer	  of	  them,	  in	  any	  world	  in	  which	   they	   occur.62	   	   As	   such,	   we	   cannot	   simply	   postulate	   a	   world	   with	  fundamental	   physics	   properties,	   add	   and	   subtract	   objects	   and	   properties	   at	  random,	   and	   a	   priori	   maintain	   that	   what	   we	   obtain	   is	   a	   new	   manifold	   of	  fundamental	   properties.	   	   But	   that	   each	   free	   recombination	   takes	   us	   from	   one	  manifold	   of	   fundamental	   properties	   to	   another	   such	   manifold	   is	   the	   central	  postulate	   of	   Lewis’	   world-­‐building	   system.	   	   Quantum	   field	   theory,	   and	   the	  fundamentality	   considerations	   it	   engenders,	   thus	   seems	   to	   strike	   right	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  what	  many	  take	  to	  be	  our	  most	  successful	  modal	  system.	  	  We	   think	   that	   this	  example	  makes	   salient	   the	   fact	   that	  even	   if	  we	  are	  happy	   to	  take	  metaphysicians	   at	   their	  word	   that	   they	   are	   engaged	   in	   ‘the	   science	   of	   the	  possible’,	   and	   even	   if	   we	   regard	   the	   investigation	   of	   metaphysical	   possibility	  space	   as	   a	   defensible	   academic	   enterprise	   in	   principle,	   it	   may	   yet	   be	   that	   the	  actual	  can	  veto	  crucial	  assumptions	  about	  what	  those	  possibilities	  are.	  As	  such,	  it	  remains	   that	   those	  metaphysicians	  who	   follow	  Lewis	   in	  engaging	   in	  systematic	  modal	   metaphysics	   have	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	   any	   respected,	   well-­‐confirmed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  See	  e.g.	  Srednicki	  (2007),	  485.	  	  62	  Of	  course,	  in	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  we	  would	  commit	  to	  how	  exactly	  it	  is	  that	  we	  understand	  ‘intrinsic’	  here:	  suffice	  to	  say	  for	  now	  that	  lone	  object-­‐based	  analyses	  seem	  entirely	   inappropriate	   in	   this	   context	   and	   are	  more	   inclined	   towards	   the	  sort	   of	   dependence-­‐based	   account	   expounded	   in	  Witmer	   et	   al.	   (2005).	   	   But	   all	  that	  is	  crucial	  for	  present	  purposes	  is	  that	  these	  facts	  about	  the	  renormalization	  group	   prohibit	   a	   conception	   of	   intrinsicality	   that	   would	   allow	   for	   free	  recombination:	  we	  cannot	  add	  arbitrarily	  many	  new	  flavors	  of	  quark	  to	  a	  world	  that	  is	   in	  other	  respects	  like	  this	  one	  and	  expect	  colour	  to	  remain	  fundamental.	  	  Thus	  if	  colour	  is	  fundamental,	  we	  cannot	  add	  or	  subtract	  objects	  from	  worlds	  in	  which	   it	   in	   instantiated	   in	   the	   way	   free	   recombination	   demands;	   and	   that	   is	  enough	  to	  prove	  the	  present	  point.	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science	   that	  describes	   the	  actual	  portions	  of	   their	  modal	  ontology,	  since	   it	  may	  reveal	  those	  assumptions	  to	  be	  false;	  in	  other	  words,	  if	  they	  want	  their	  systems	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  then	  they	  should	  respect	  the	  compatibility	  principle.63	  	  So	  if	  the	  aim	  of	  appealing	  to	   ‘the	  science	  of	  the	  possible’	  was	  to	  get	  around	  the	  need	  for	  compatibility,	  it	  seems	  that	  really	  nothing	  has	  been	  gained.	  	  
6.	  The	  Tension	  	  This,	   then,	   is	  where	  we’re	  at.	   	  We’ve	  said	   that	  some	  scientifically	  disinterested	  metaphysics	  should	  be	  protected	  from	  naturalistic	  criticism,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  has	  proved	  useful	  in	  a	  naturalistic	  context.	  We’ve	  said	  that	  nevertheless	  some	  metaphysics	   –	   namely,	   that	   which	   falls	   foul	   of	   the	   compatibility	   principle	   –	  should	  by	  contrast	  be	  condemned.	   	  We’ve	  also	  underlined	  that	  metaphysicians’	  attempt	  to	  recast	  any	  compatibility-­‐principle	  flouting	  metaphysics	  as	  merely	  ‘the	  science	  of	  the	  possible’	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  exonerating	  them	  from	  their	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  principle.	  	  What,	  then,	  is	  our	  worry?	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  our	  worry	  is	  this.	  	  While	  we	  still	  deny	  that	  nothing	  in	  metaphysics	  is	  in	  principle	  incompatible	  with	  actual	  science,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  ‘science	  of	  the	  possible’	  move	  would	   hope,	   we	  worry	   that,	   given	   our	   argument	   for	   taking	   the	  
‘heuristic	  approach’	  to	  metaphysics,	  we	  are	  not	  actually	  in	  any	  position	  to	  demand	  
compatibility	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that,	   ultimately,	  we	  have	  only	  the	  dimmest	  idea	  of	  what	  changes	  in	  physics	  lie	  ahead	  of	  us.64	  	  How,	  then,	  do	  we	  know	  that	  the	  current	  metaphysical	  models,	  even	  though	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  contradiction	   with	   actual	   physics	   and	   problematic	   for	   that	   reason,	   might	   not	  themselves	   come	   to	   be	   useful	   in	   the	   course	   of	   time?	   And	   given	   that	   we	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	   It	   may	   be	   worthwhile	   noting	   at	   this	   point	   just	   how	   much	   weaker	   the	  requirement	  that	  our	  theory	  of	  possibility	  be	  consistent	  with	  physics	  is	  than	  the	  demand	   that	   all	   possibility	   is	  physical	  possibility:	  were	   it	  not	   the	   case	   that	   the	  fundamental	   physics	   properties	   were	   intrinsic,	   some	   variant	   of	   Lewis’	  recombinatorial	   thesis	  might	  have	  had	  a	   shot	  at	   structuring	  a	  possibility	   space	  with	  physically	  impossible	  worlds	  in	  it.	  64	  This	  isn’t	  of	  course	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  no	  principles	  we	  can	  expect	  to	  govern	  theory	  development:	  we	  should	  at	  the	  very	  least	  demand	  correspondence	  in	  the	  limit	   (cf	   Post	   1971).	   	   But	   satisfaction	   of	   that	   requirement	   of	   course	   still	  underdetermines	  a	  great	  deal.	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resisted	   the	   blanket	   condemnation	   of	   contemporary	  metaphysics	   by	   Ladyman	  and	   Ross	   on	   these	   heuristic	   grounds,	   how	   are	   we	   then	   not	   committed	   to	  sanctioning	  essentially	  a	  free-­‐for-­‐all	  in	  metaphysics,	  in	  which	  any	  metaphysics	  –	  as	  domesticated,	  juvenile,	  and	  intuition-­‐driven	  as	  you	  like	  –	  is	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  immune	  from	  criticism?	  This	   conclusion	   leaves	   us	   somewhat	   aghast!	  And	   since	   it	   seems	   to	   us	   that	   one	  cannot	  reasonably	  deny	  either	  that	  philosophers	  of	  physics	  have	  utilized	  analytic	  metaphysics	   to	   their	  benefit,	  or	   that	   the	  compatibility	  principle	   is	  a	   reasonable	  requirement	  on	  theories,	  or	  indeed	  that	  what	  lies	  ahead	  in	  science	  is	  something	  that	  we	  cannot	  at	  this	  point	  predict,	  this	  conclusion	  too	  strikes	  us	  as	  somewhat	  paradoxical.	  Before	  turning	  to	  what	  exactly	  it	  is	  that	  we	  should	  say	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  seeming	  paradox,	  we	  sketch	  some	  responses	  the	  naturalistic	  metaphysician	  might	  offer	   to	  see	  off	   the	  metaphysical	   free-­‐for-­‐all	   that	  seems	  to	  beckon	  at	   this	  point.	  Disappointingly,	  however,	  we	  don’t	  think	  that	  any	  of	  them	  really	  succeed.	  	  	  The	  naturalist	  might	  first	  point	  out	  that	  
i.	  Analytic	  constructions	  never	  survive	  in	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  in	  the	  form	  
they	  were	  originally	  given.	  Consider	  again	  the	  PII.	  	  While	  arguably	  ruled	  out	  by	  quantum	   mechanics	   in	   its	   original	   form,	   it	   resurfaced	   through	   the	   work	   of	  Saunders:	  following	  Quine,	  he	  extended	  the	  principle	  to	  cover	  both	  the	  ‘intrinsic	  denominations’	   of	   objects	   as	   well	   as	   their	   relations	   to	   one	   another,	   and	   in	   so	  doing	   significantly	   changed	   the	   dialectic	   in	   the	   debate	   over	   quantum	  individuality.65	  	  This	  illustrates	  the	  fact	  that	  analytic	  constructions	  typically	  only	  function	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  naturalistic	  metaphysics,	  for	  they	  are	  then	  altered	  and	  adapted	  in	  various	  ways	  to	  suit	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  physical	  situation.	   	  This,	   it	  might	  be	  claimed,	  blocks	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  analytic	  constructions	   themselves	   are	  actually	   useful	   in	   naturalistic	   contexts,	   because	   they	   generally	   need	   to	   be	  significantly	   altered;	   and	   if	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   this	   blocks	   the	   idea	   that	   they	  should	  be	  valued	  insofar	  as	  we	  value	  naturalistic	  metaphysics.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  On	  how	  this	  Quinean	  form	  is	  not	  the	  same	  construction	  as	  the	  Leibnizian	  PII	  see	  Bigaj	  and	  Ladyman	  2010.	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But	  of	  course,	  this	  fact	  that	  analytic	  constructions	  are	  typically	  altered	  in	  various	  ways	   is	   perfectly	   consistent	   with	   our	   heuristic	   approach,	   in	   which	   we	   value	  analytic	  constructions	  as	  tools	  for	  the	  development	  of	  more	  tailor-­‐made	  theories.	  	  	  After	  all,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  a	  tool	  is	  useful	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  only	  does	  not	  make	  it	  any	  less	  of	  a	  tool.	  A	  much	  better	  objection	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  even	  compatibility-­‐principle	  flouting	  metaphysics	  might	  prove	  useful	  in	  the	  future	  is	  the	  widely-­‐held	  belief	  that:	  	  
ii.	  Physics	  is	  likely	  only	  going	  to	  get	  less	  classical,	  not	  more.	  66	  	  And	  should	  it	  do	  so,	   it	   is	  obviously	  going	  to	  move	  further	  and	  further	  away	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  initial	  intuitions	  that	  motivate	  analytic	  constructions.	  	  Thus	  insofar	  as	  a	  big	  part	  of	   the	   problem	   with	   contemporary	   metaphysics	   is	   that	   it	   is	   so	   stubbornly	  classical,	   if	  what	   prompts	   the	  worry	   that	  we	   are	   committed	   to	   a	  metaphysical	  free-­‐for-­‐all	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  physics	  will	  throw	  at	  us	  in	  the	  future	  then	  we	  are	  worrying	  about	  nothing.	  	  While	  this	  point	  seems	  broadly	  compelling,	  we	  ourselves	  are	  less	  convinced	  that	  things	   are	   so	   simple.	   	   First	   of	   all,	   we	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   we	   still	   lack	   a	  demonstration	   that	   gravity	   is	   amenable	   to	   quantum	   treatment,	   so	   that	   at	   this	  point,	  for	  all	  we	  know,	  classicality	  might	  be	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  world.67	  	  But	  even	  if	  fundamental	  physics	  should	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  pervasively	  non-­‐classical	  (as	   of	   course	   seems	   a	   pretty	   good	   bet),	   it	   remains	   that	   classical	   metaphysical	  concepts	  may	  be	  crucial	   for	   interpreting	  it.	   	  One	  obvious	  reason	  for	  this	   is	  that,	  insofar	   as	   the	  measurement	  problem	  has	  been	   the	   core	   conceptual	  problem	   in	  quantum	   theory,	   that	   conceptual	   problem	   concerns,	   in	   part,	   the	   relationship	  between	  quantum	  and	  classical	  ontology,	  and	  illuminating	  the	  nature	  of	  one	  term	  in	   a	   relationship	   can	   often	   illuminate	   the	   relation	   itself.	   	   Indeed,	   in	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  We	  might	  mention	  in	  passing	  that	  David	  Bohm	  was	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  world	  was	   structured	   in	   alternating	   layers	   governed	   by	   classical	   and	   quantum	  principles,	   although	   he	   provided	   little	   by	   way	   of	   support	   for	   this	   claim!	   	   See	  Bohm	  1957,	  chapter	  4.	  67	  And	  of	  course,	  the	  different	  interpretations	  of	  QM	  present	  it	  as	  being	  dissimilar	  to	  classical	  physics	   in	  various	  respects	  and	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  so	   that	  classical	  concepts	  whatsoever	  may	  well	  be	  useful	  in	  interpreting	  future	  quantum	  physics	  for	  that	  reason.	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connection	  one	  need	  only	  think	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Wallace	  to	  appreciate	  how	  getting	  a	   better	  purchase	  on	   the	  nature	  non-­‐fundamental,	   including	   classical,	   ontology	  can	  be	  illuminating	  in	  this	  way.68	  	  It	   might	   be	   objected	   at	   this	   point,	   however,	   that	   this	   is	   a	   red	   herring	   in	   this	  context:	   no-­‐one	   ever	   thought	   that	   there	   need	   be	   anything	   problematic	   in	  principle	  about	  a	  metaphysics	  describing	  the	  classical	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  explicit	  that	  that	  metaphysics	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  about	  non-­‐fundamental	  ontology.69	  	  Thus	  one	  might	   object	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   in	   Wallace’s	   metaphysics	   of	   the	   non-­‐fundamental	   that	   gives	   license	   to	   the	   sorts	   of	   metaphysics	   we	   cited	   at	   the	  beginning.	  	  Nevertheless,	  and	  even	  though	  that	  latter	  metaphysics	  has	  misguided	  ambitions	   to	   directly	   describe	   the	   fundamental	   and	   thus	   seems	   to	   flout	   the	  compatibility	   principle	   as	   a	   result,	   we	   still	   think	   that	   such	   compatibility	  principle-­‐flouting	   metaphysics	   may	   well	   have	   a	   useful	   function	   in	   naturalistic	  contexts.	   	   To	   see	   this,	   consider	   again	   the	   objections	   that	   have	   been	   made	   to	  Lewis’	   separability	   assumption.	   	   By	   now	   everyone	   knows	   that	   one	   cannot	  blithely	  maintain,	  as	  Lewis	  did,	  that	  separability	  is	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  world,	   because	   it	   is	   arguably	   so	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   basic	   structure	   of	   quantum	  mechanics.70	   	   However,	   in	   learning	   that,	   do	   we	   not	   thereby	   learn	   something	  important	  about	  quantum	  metaphysics?	  	  Is	  it	  not	  the	  case,	  in	  point	  of	  fact,	  that	  we	  actually	   understand	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   the	   metaphysical	   content	   of	   quantum	  mechanics	  precisely	  by	  understanding	  what	  classical	  metaphysical	   concepts	  do	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  See	  e.g.	  Wallace	  2010.	  69	  While	   as	  we	  noted	   there	   has	   been	   a	   preoccupation	  with	   the	   fundamental	   in	  metaphysics,	   we	   ourselves	   do	   not	   think	   that	   an	   ‘effective’	   metaphysics	   of	   the	  non-­‐fundamental	   is	   in	   principle	   unnecessary	   or	   illegitimate;	   indeed,	   we	   think	  that	  the	  embrace	  of	  merely	  ‘effective’	  ontologies	  in	  physics	  at	  least	  invites	  us	  to	  embrace	  a	  merely	  effective	  metaphysics	  of	  it.	  70	   Though	   of	   course	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   this	   is	   true	   depends	   on	   what	  interpretation	  of	  QM	  is	  adopted;	  see	  e.g.	  Miller	  (2013);	  Belousek	  (2003).	  This	  is	  of	   course	  not	   to	   say	   that	  one	   should	   regard	   separability	  as	   thereby	  vindicated;	  the	  point	  is	  that	  one	  cannot	  blithely	  maintain	  it,	  partly	  because	  doing	  so	  is	  replete	  with	  other	  physical	  implications.	   	   	  We	  note	  also	  that	  it	  an	  approach	  to	  quantum	  mechanics	  in	  which	  the	  wavefunction	  is	  taken	  to	  evolve	  in	  configuration	  space	  is	  widely	  held	  to	  restore	  separability.	  	  But	  we	  ourselves	  are	  deeply	  skeptical	  about	  the	   viability	   of	   such	   an	   approach,	   primarily	   because	   such	   a	   space	   requires	  particle	   number	   to	   be	   well-­‐defined	   at	   all	   times	   and	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	  relativistically;	  on	  this,	  see	  Myrvold	  (ms).	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not	  apply	   in	   that	  context,	  and	  on	  account	  of	  what	  principles?	   	   It	  seems	  to	  us	  at	  least	   that	   understanding	   that	   quantum	   physics	   is	   (arguably)	   not	   local	   and	   not	  separable	  in	  the	  way	  that	  classical	  metaphysics	  is	  is	  actually	  absolutely	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  quantum	  physics,	  and	  it	  also	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  all	   but	   the	  most	   specialized	   philosophers	   of	   physics	  will	   struggle	   to	   fill	   in	   the	  details	   of	   a	  positive	   picture	   as	   to	  what	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   quantum	  physics	   is,	  beyond	  justifying	  and	  elaborating	  upon	  these	  negative	  claims.	  	  It	  therefore	  seems	  to	   us	   that	   while	   what	   philosophers	   of	   physics	   are	   ultimately	   aiming	   for	   is	   a	  
positive	  picture	  of	  quantum	  reality,	  classical	  metaphysics	  can	  nonetheless	  furnish	  us	   with	   negative	   analogies	   that	   are	   crucial	   for	   understanding	   quantum	  metaphysics,	   and	   especially	   so	   while	   we	   remain	   in	   lieu	   of	   a	   clear	   positive	  picture.71	   	   Therefore	   even	   though	   assertions	   such	   as	   Lewis’s	   that	   the	  fundamental	   level	   exhibits	   separability	   fall	   foul	   of	   the	   compatibility	   principle,	  
recognizing	  that	  they	  do	  so	  can	  be	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  metaphysical	  theories	   that	  are	  appropriate	  at	   the	   fundamental	   level.	   	  Thus,	  while	  clearly	  not	  every	   negative	   analogy	   stands	   a	   chance	   of	   being	   relevant	   and	   illuminating,	   it	  seems	  that	  even	  false	  metaphysics	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  useful	   in	  this	  sense.	   	  And	  that	   just	   seems	   to	   corroborate	   our	   worry	   that	   our	   heuristic	   justification	   can	  sanction	  even	  compatibility	  principle-­‐flouting	  metaphysics.	  
	  Finally,	  it	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  	  
iii.	   The	   heuristic	   approach	   instrumentalizes	  metaphysics	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	  
patronizing	   to	   metaphysicians.	   	   Perhaps.	   	   But	   seeing	   that	   contemporary	  metaphysicians	   seem	  somewhat	  desperate	   to	  have	   their	  discipline	   regarded	  as	  akin	  to	  the	  sciences	  (as	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘science	  of	  the	  possible’	  moniker	  itself	  suggests),	   and	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   obvious	   alternative	   accolades	   for	   analytic	  metaphysics	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  contemporary	  disciplines,	  we	  believe	  that	  metaphysicians	   would	   be	   very	   willing	   to	   embrace	   our	   justification	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	   Furthermore,	   given	   that	   our	   concepts	   were	   acquired	   in	   the	   same	   classical	  environments	  that	  metaphysicians	  treat	  as	  exhaustive	  of	  reality,	  perhaps	  there	  is	  a	  claim	  to	  be	  made	  that	  the	  classical	  will	  always	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  privileged	  role	  in	   our	   metaphysical	   understanding	   (a	   conjecture	   that	   of	   course	   recalls	   Bohr).	  	  But	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  pursue	  this	  point	  here.	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metaphysics	   in	   heuristic	   terms.72	   	   Furthermore,	   our	   stance	   preserves	   the	  autonomy	   of	   metaphysics	   in	   a	   way	   that	   the	   approach	   of	   Ladyman	   and	   others	  does	  not.	  All	   that	  metaphysicians	  have	  to	  accept	   is	   the	  occasional	  raiding	  party	  from	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  keen	  (we	  hope)	  to	  see	  what	  they’re	  up	  to	  and	  what	  they	   can	   use	   for	   their	   own	   purposes;	   or,	   putting	   it	   once	   again	   in	   less	  confrontational	   terms,	   all	   that	   they	   have	   to	   put	   up	   with	   is	   the	   perspective	   –	  which	  they	  don’t	  even	  have	  to	  be	  made	  aware	  of	  –	  that	  as	  far	  as	  philosophers	  of	  science	  are	  concerned,	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  is	  filling	  up	  the	  toolbox	  for	  us.	  	  	  	  
7.	  Evaluation	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  this	  defense	  of	  even	  compatibility	  principle-­‐flouting	  metaphysics	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  even	  that	  might	  come	  in	  useful	  in	  the	  course	  of	  time,	  we	  find	  ourselves	  at	  a	  point	  that	  has	  notes	  of	  Lakatos	  –	   in	  that	  we	  are	  claiming	  that	  no	  proposition	  of	  metaphysics	  may	  categorically	  be	  pronounced	  dead.	  	  	  And	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  defending	  analytic	  metaphysics	  in	  general	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  may	  prove	  a	  useful	  heuristic	  for	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  our	  position	  also	  invokes	  Feyerabend	  in	  that	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  imposition	  of	  normative	  constraints	  risks	  choking	   off	   progress	   down	   the	   line.	   At	   this	   point,	   then,	   the	   conclusion	   that	  analytic	  metaphysics	  is	  simply	  off	  the	  hook,	  free	  to	  get	  back	  on	  with	  business	  as	  usual,	  seems	  ineluctable,	  and	  as	  such	  that	  the	  criticisms	  of	  so	  many	  philosophers	  of	  science	  must	  simply	  be	  withdrawn.	  	  We	  think,	  however,	  that	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  situation	  reveals	  this	  to	  be	  the	  wrong	  conclusion.	   	   Reminiscent	   of	   how	   one’s	  modus	   ponens	   can	   be	   another’s	  modus	  
tollens,	  we	  think	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  conclusion	  is	  even	  mooted	  draws	  attention	  to	  just	  how	  precarious	  our	  heuristic	  justification	  of	  metaphysics	  is.	  	  While	  we	  do,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Paul	  2012	  is	  another	  expression	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  see	  metaphysics	  as	  analogous	  to	  science.	   	  (We	  might	  add	  that	  seeing	  as	  metaphysicians	  have	  arguably	  had	  an	  insecurity	  complex	  about	  mathematics	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  time	  of	  Plato	  (see	  e.g.	  Moore	   2012,	   passim),	   we	   think	   that	   the	   analogy	   with	   pure	   mathematics	   is	  something	  they	  will	  be	  more	  than	  happy	  to	  embrace	  too.)	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to	   be	   sure,	   remain	   convinced	   that	   it	   is	   difficult	   for	   the	   naturalist	   to	   flatly	  condemn	  the	  work	  of	  analytic	  metaphysicians	  given	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  have	  appropriated,	  and	  continue	  to	  appropriate,	  it	  in	  our	  own	  work,	  we	  think	  that	  the	  tension	   articulated	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   brings	   to	   light	   just	   how	   highly	  
conditionalized	  that	  justification	  is.	  Thus	  note	  that	  insofar	  as	  any	  support	  can	  be	  given	   to	   either	   Type	   I	   or	   Type	   II	  metaphysics	   via	   the	   heuristic	   approach,	   that	  support	  is	  conditionalized	  twice	  over:	  it	  is	  conditionalized	  i. upon	   naturalistic	   metaphysicians	   continuing	   to	   take	   metaphysics	  down	  ‘off	  the	  shelf’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  making	  it	  to	  order	  and	  developing	  it	  on	  their	  own;	  and	  furthermore	  ii. upon	  those	  analytical	  constructions	  actually	  turning	  out	  to	  be	  relevant	  and	  useful	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  science	  as	  it	  evolves.	  	  How	   likely	   is	   it,	   we	   must	   ask,	   that	   each	   of	   these	   conditions	   will	   be	   fulfilled?	  Regarding	  point	  (ii),	  we	  are	  not	  sure	  how	  much	  can	  be	  said	  given	  that	  whether	  or	  not	   it	   is	   fulfilled	  hangs	  on	   future	   scientific	   developments	   that	  we	  have	   already	  argued	  are	  difficult	  to	  foresee.	  	  And	  regarding	  point	  (i),	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  too	  is	  going	  to	  hang	  on	  the	  trajectory	  of	  science,	  but	  we	  should	  note	  that	  it	  hangs	  on	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  as	  well.	  	  For	  whether	  or	  not	  (i)	  is	  fulfilled	  will	  depend	  on	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  utilizing	  extant	  packages	   instead	  of	  making	  everything	   to	   order	   is	   not	   a	   grossly	   inefficient	  way	   to	   go	   about	   things.73	   	   	   But	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  grossly	  inefficient	  is	  going	  to	  be	  at	  least	  in	  part	  a	  function	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relevant	  future	  science,	  and	  also	  of	  our	  success	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  –	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  highly	  classical	  constructions	  will	  be	  useful	  and	  relevant	   depends	   on	   how	  non-­‐classical	   future	   physics	  will	   turn	   out	   to	   be,	  plus	  how	   successful	   philosophers	   of	   physics	   are	   in	   coming	   up	   with	   positive	   as	  opposed	   to	  purely	  negative	   interpretations	  of	   that	  physics	   (the	   latter,	  we	  have	  argued,	   being	   likely	   to	   be	   cashed	   out	   in	   terms	   of	   negative	   analogies	   with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Of	  course,	  if	  the	  packages	  are	  already	  there	  it	  would	  seem	  churlish	  not	  to	  use	  them.	  	  But	  that	  clearly	  cannot	  be	  cited	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  continuing	  to	  produce	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place.
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classical)74.	  	  And	  what	  the	  prospects	  are	  in	  either	  case	  is	  not	  something	  that	  we	  feel	  anyone	  is	  in	  much	  of	  a	  position	  to	  place	  bets	  on.75	  	  	  We	   think	   it	   follows	   from	   this	   that,	   while	   our	   heuristic	   considerations	   do	   in	  principle	  lend	  some	  support	  to	  analytic	  metaphysics,	  whether	  of	  Type	  I	  or	  Type	  II,	  that	  support	  is	  highly	  conditional	  and	  contingent	  on	  goings	  on	  both	  in	  science	  and	   in	   a	   naturalistic	  metaphysics	   of	   it.	   	   But	   now	   contrast	   the	   support	  we	   have	  offered	   empirically	   disengaged	   metaphysics,	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	   tool	   for	  
philosophers	  of	  science,	  with	  our	  criticisms	  regarding	  metaphysics	  conceived	  of	  as	  
it	  is	  within	  the	  contemporary	  discipline	  –	  namely,	  as	  the	  ‘science	  of	  the	  possible’.	  	  Recall	   that	   it	   was	   many	   analytic	   metaphysicians’	   stated	   concern	   with	   mere	  possibilia	   that	  was	   supposed	   to	   relieve	   its	   practitioners	   of	   any	   duty	   to	   engage	  with	  physics.	  	  We	  argued	  that	  such	  disengagement	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  sanctioned	  on	  that	   basis,	   for	   this	   conception	   puts	   modal	   metaphysics	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  metaphysics,	   and	   systematic	   theories	   of	   modality,	   we	   have	   argued,	   can	   be	  falsified	  by	  actual	  physics.76	  	  We	  think	  that	  this	  shows	  that	  even	  if	  one	  conceives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  It	  may	  be,	  as	  a	  referee	  has	  suggested,	  that	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  philosophers	  of	  science	  simply	  refuse	  to	  use	  any	  tools	  from	  analytic	  metaphysics	  and	  of	  course,	  there	  would	  then	  be	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  analytic	  metaphysics	  could	  be	  described	  as	  having	  failed	  to	  be	  useful.	  Perhaps,	  then,	  we	  should	  be	  considering	  the	  tools	  that	  philosophers	  of	  science	  could	  be	  employing	  or	  ought	   to	  be.	   	  But	  this	  we	  feel	  we	  cannot	  do.	  	  Think	  of	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  philosophers	  of	  science	  might	  turn	  their	  backs	  on	  metaphysics.	   	   Ignoring	  mere	  churlishness	  or	  even	  other	  broadly	  ‘sociological’	  reasons,	  a	  likely	  reason	  is	  that	  philosophers	  of	  science	  simply	  reach	  the	  point	  where	  the	  tools	  made	  available	  by	  metaphysics	  are	  not	  fit	  for	  purpose,	  whether	   through	   their	   inherent	   classicality	   or	   whatever.	   Under	   those	  circumstances,	   of	   course,	   the	   game,	   as	   it	   were,	   would	   be	   up,	   as	   would	   be	   the	  possibility	   of	   any	   further	   fruitful	   relationship	   between	   metaphysics	   and	   the	  philosophy	   of	   science.	   But	   in	   that	   situation,	  we	   can’t	   talk	   about	  what	   tools	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  using	  either	  –	  or	  at	  least,	  not	  for	  now.	  75	   Though	   if	   it	   is	   objected	   that	   this	   makes	   for	   a	   ‘monkeys	   at	   typewriters’	  evaluation	   of	  metaphysics,	  we	   could	   say	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   at	   least	   to	   some	  extent,	  for	  science	  as	  well!	  76	   Given	   what	   we	   have	   said	   about	   the	   future	   of	   physics	   being	   unpredictable,	  should	  we	  therefore	  not	  say	  that	  our	  argument	  that	  the	  fundamental	  properties	  such	  as	  colour	  charge	  are	  not	  intrinsic	  likewise	  could	  be	  falsified,	  so	  that	  Lewis’	  theory,	  is,	  for	  all	  we	  know,	  still	  a	  live	  possibility?	  	  We	  ourselves	  think	  that	  such	  a	  move	  would	   be	   somewhat	   pathetic,	   but	   we	   are	   sure	   the	   reader	   can	   fill	   in	   the	  reasons	  why.	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of	  metaphysics	  in	  these	  terms,	  then	  that	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  absolve	  metaphysicians	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  engage	  with	  science	  in	  a	  fundamental	  way.	  	  	  Putting	  everything	  together,	  then,	  the	  following	  picture	  emerges.	  	  While	  there	  is	  heuristic	   support	   for	  analytic	  metaphysics	   if	   the	   latter	   is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	   tool	  for	   philosophy	   of	   science,	   that	   support	   is	   highly	   conditional	   on	   contingent	  developments	   outside	   of	   it.	   	   If,	   however,	   we	   conceive	   of	   metaphysics	   as	  contemporary	   metaphysicians	   themselves	   do,	   then	   there	   are	   strong	   and	  seemingly	  categorical	  arguments	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  has	  to	  engage	  with	  science.	  	  Whatever	   conditionalized	   support	   metaphysics	   gets	   from	   naturalistic	  metaphysics,	   then,	   it	   seems	   that	  metaphysicians	  must	   themselves	   concede	   that	  the	   systematic	   disregard	   of	   real	   science	   simply	   cannot	   continue	   if	   they	   are	   to	  take	  their	  own	  projects	  seriously.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  most	  central	  of	  the	  criticisms	   with	   which	   we	   opened	   up	   this	   paper	   remain	   as	   trenchant	   as	   they	  appeared	  then.	  	  Naturalistic	  metaphysicians	  were	  never	  telling	  anyone	  that	  they	  shouldn’t	  do	  metaphysics.	  	  What	  we	  object	  to	  is	  only	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  should	  take	  place	  in	  a	  disciplinary	  vacuum.	  	  But	  it	  has	  to	  be	  said	  that	  the	  picture	  we	  have	  painted	  is	  a	  complicated	  one,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  considerations	  pulling	  from	  both	  sides.	  	  As	  things	  stand,	  both	  those	  who	  would	  decry	  contemporary	  metaphysics	  and	  those	  who	  would	  defend	  it	  are	  doing	  so	  from	  crude	  defensive	  positions.	  What	   is	  needed	  is	   the	  development	  of	  more	   nuanced	   positions	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   more	   productive	   engagement	  between	  the	  two	  factions	  might	  be	  achieved.	  We	  would	  hope	  that	  the	  perspective	  developed	  here	  and	  in	  our	  previous	  work	  will	  contribute	  to	  that	  engagement.	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